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I. INTRODUCTION
After castration, the gay man wrote, “I hate myself; but I can’t help it . . . I
have no right to live.” His doctors concluded that his sterilization must
have been ill-advised, noting, “mutilation produces a depressing effect,
while it does not remove the perverted tendency.”1

Historically, sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”)2 by licensed
healthcare providers entailed “treatment” that would now be regarded as
egregious abuse. While castration is no longer considered acceptable, a
small number of healthcare providers continue to advocate forms of talkbased conversion therapy sought primarily by some religious patients.3
Controversial and politically charged, sexual orientation change efforts
seek to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity.4 Many find
*
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University of Virginia School of Law. The author thanks Nadia Sawicki, Diane Hoffman, Ana Iltis, Dee
Pridgen, and Jacob Victor for providing thoughtful comments, Cameron Pestinger for invaluable research
assistance, and George and Sally Hopper for a research grant.
1
Havelock Ellis & E.S. Talbot, Castration “I think it was that operation . . . that caused my
insanity”, J. MENTAL SCI. (1896), reprinted in GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN
THE U.S.A., 140–41, 143 (Johnathan Katz ed., 1976).
2
Sexual orientation change efforts are also known as “conversion,” “reparative,” “reorientation,”
“ex-gay,” or “sexual attraction fluidity exploration” therapy. See, e.g., Christopher Rosik, Sexual
Attraction Fluidity Exploration in Therapy (SAFE-T), ALLIANCE FOR THERAPEUTIC CHOICE & SCI.
INTEGRITY 1, http://media.wix.com/ugd/ec16e9_1940a968273d47f5be4bdf9614d2dd0c.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).
3
See, e.g., NARTH Institute Statement on Sexual Orientation Change, NARTH INST. (Jan. 25,
2012), http://www.narth.com/about1 (“[T]he Alliance [for Therapeutic Choice and Scientific Inquiry]
remains committed to protecting the rights of clients with unwanted same-sex attractions to pursue
change as well as the rights of clinicians to provide such psychological care.”); AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 3 (Aug. 2009),
https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [hereinafter APA Report] (noting that
most SOCE research participants are adults “who consider religion to be an extremely important part of
their lives and participate in traditional or conservative faiths (i.e. The Church of Latter-Day Saints,
evangelical Christianity, and Orthodox Judaism)”).
4
This Article focuses on sexual orientation change efforts, not reorientation efforts targeting
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such efforts offensive because they suggest that there is something wrong
with being a sexual minority or having same-sex attractions. Some who
have participated in SOCE report that this therapy led to increased
depression, anxiety, and stigma.5 Others, however, claim to have benefited
from SOCE and see bans on the practice as curtailing religious freedom. 6
Recently, legal reforms limiting or deterring conversion therapy in
different ways have been rapidly gaining ground. While most reforms
focus on legislative bans on state-licensed health professionals providing
conversion therapy to minors, several national organizations have also
turned to consumer protection litigation to curtail deceptive practices.7 This
Article compares the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches and
offers a broader prescriptive remedy.
Scholarship evaluating this developing area of law remains embryonic. 8
This Article seeks to remedy that in three ways.9 First, this Article
gender identity. Some advocates argue that state conversion therapy bans should specifically include
gender identity (and exclude treatment that supports gender transition). See, e.g., LGBT Policy
Spotlight:
Conversion
Therapy
Bans,
MOVEMENT
ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/policy-spotlight-conversion-therapy-bans (last updated May 2015). Many
points made in this Article, like concern over expressive harm, would seem to apply equally to
conversion therapy efforts directed at gender identity. Nonetheless, because the issues and arguments
involved with gender identity change efforts are, at least at times, distinct, they are beyond the scope of
this Article. See, e.g., Richard Green, Banning Therapy to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender
Identity in Patients Under 18, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE 7, 10 (2017) (“[R]ecent
legislation with its conflation of sexual orientation and gender identity remains psychiatrically
incoherent.”).
5
APA Report, supra note 3, at 50.
6
APA Report, supra note 3, at 3; see also Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about the
Alliance for Therapeutic Choice and Scientific Integrity (ATCSI) and the NARTH Institute and
Homosexuality, NARTH INST., http://www.narth.com/faq (last visited July 23, 2016) (“[T]here are
many individuals who reported that this type of therapy has provided significant positive benefits in
their lives.”).
7
See infra Section II(B).
8
To date, only three Notes address consumer protection as a strategy to combat SOCE, and they
are all very different from this Article. Peter R. Dubrowski, The Ferguson v. JONAH Verdict and a
Path Towards National Cessation of Gay-to-Straight “Conversion Therapy”, 110 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 77, 90–93 (2015) (a practice-oriented article assessing state laws to demonstrate opportunities
and obstacles in applying the JONAH model); John M. Satira, Note, Determining the Deception of
Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 641, 645, 652–55, 657–63, 669–71 (2016)
(discussing how consumer protection laws provide opportunity to discredit SOCE, how SOCE
practitioners may adapt, and possible roadblocks to widespread consumer protection attacks) (citing
Melissa Ballengee Alexander, Victim to Victor: A Right to Health Perspective on Ferguson v. JONAH,
LGBTQ ISSUES IN PHIL. (Am. Phil. Ass’n, Newark, Del.), Spring 2016, at 2, 4); Jacob M. Victor, Note,
Regulating Sexual Orientation Change Efforts: The California Approach, its Limitations, and Potential
Alternatives, 123 YALE L.J. 1532, 1535–37, 1564–65 (2014) (criticizing bans for essentializing sexual
identity and generating political backlash, then arguing in favor of utilizing deceptive-based regulation
but doubtful of JONAH style consumer litigation). Outside the context of SOCE, there is more
scholarship on the value that consumer protection litigation adds to health. See, e.g., Lee Ann Bundren,
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documents recent legal reforms limiting conversion therapy, including
never-before examined strategies such as defunding. Second, the Article
expresses concern regarding two significant unintended consequences of
legislative bans: driving SOCE to unmonitored, untrained providers and
erosion of the mature minor doctrine.10 Third, this Article proposes an
alternative solution to conversion therapy concerns, focusing on informed
consent, consumer protection, and defunding.11
Part II of this Article summarizes the empirical evidence on conversion
therapy, which lacks compelling proof of efficacy or safety. Then, it
describes recent rapid legal reforms relating to conversion therapy,
including legislative bans on state-licensed health professionals providing
conversion therapy to minors, administrative regulations limiting funding
and insurance for conversion therapy, and consumer protection based
accountability efforts. Part III argues that the trend of health provider bans
on conversion therapy for minors, although well-intentioned and intuitively
appealing, poses potentially pernicious consequences both to minors
demanding SOCE and to autonomy that outweigh any benefit. Part IV
suggests that efforts to limit abuses associated with SOCE should instead
focus on improving informed consent, increasing accountability for
deceptive practices, and eliminating state funding. Together, these
strategies will deter SOCE and change social norms regarding sexual
minorities more effectively than health provider bans, without the same risk
Comment, State Consumer Fraud Legislation Applied to the Health Care Industry: Are Health Care
Professionals Being “Consumed”?, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 165–66 (1995) (concluding that consumer
protection acts should apply to health care professionals); Joan H. Krause, The Role of the States in
Combating Managed Care Fraud and Abuse, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 179, 179 (1999) (recognizing the
benefits of state consumer protection laws in combating health fraud).
9
In contrast, most recent scholarship on conversion therapy has focused on the First Amendment
professional speech issue and the tension between parent and state over controversial medical treatment
for a child. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44
HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 682–84 (2016) (discussing the disagreement between the Third and Ninth
Circuits regarding the First Amendment status of psychotherapy); Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech
and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests at the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV.
293, 294 (2014) (analyzing SOCE in the context of state control over physician speech); Lynn D.
Wardle, Controversial Medical Treatments for Children: The Roles of Parents and of the State, 49 FAM.
L.Q. 509, 511–12 (2015) (addressing the conflict between the constitutional rights of parents to direct
the medical treatment of their children and the state interest in regulating parenting activities in the best
interest of minors).
10
The mature minor doctrine refers to the decision to allow certain minors the authority to make
healthcare decisions traditionally reserved for their parents. While the scope and exceptions vary
widely, all fifty states recognize some version of the mature minor doctrine. See Ana S. Iltis, Parents,
Adolescents, and Consent for Research Participation, 38 J. MED. & PHILOS. 332, 334 (2013)
(documenting the trend toward expansion of the mature minor doctrine).
11
When this Article refers to consumer protection accountability, it primarily references and discusses state
unfair and deceptive acts and practices (“UDAP”) statutes.
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to participants and to the mature minor doctrine. While recommending
these strategies in lieu of health provider bans, this section also recognizes
that these broader remedial tools could be used to supplement bans.12
II. CONVERSION THERAPY: LACK OF EFFICACY, POSSIBILITY OF HARM,
AND EFFORTS TO REFORM
A. Insufficient Evidence of Efficacy; Concern Over Risk of Harm
Sexual orientation change efforts vary widely and may include
behavioral, psychoanalytic, medical, or religious interventions.13 However,
most forms of conversion therapy rest on two premises: (1) same-sex
attraction is a mental illness or disorder, and (2) same-sex attraction can be
changed through therapeutic intervention.14
While conversion therapy was once widely accepted, prominent
medical organizations have uniformly issued position statements within the
last decade advising against the practice and its underlying premises.15

12
This Article proposes a strategy intended to align with the goals (but not the methods) of health provider
bans. Even a reader who remains skeptical that health provider bans pose risks will hopefully pursue the
recommended informed consent, consumer protection, and defunding strategies. After all, these mechanisms
provide means to expand the scope of protection to address SOCE abuses suffered by adults and to combat
SOCE abuses committed by more non-healthcare providers. These tools can be used immediately in most states,
even if the state has not or will not pass a SOCE ban.
13
One of the challenges facing empirical evidence relating to conversion therapy is the great
breadth of practices falling under that description. Because studies over time have included a wide
variety of practices, it is difficult to accurately draw conclusions regarding the efficacy or harm of any
particular practice.
14
Douglas C. Haldeman, Gay Rights, Patient Rights: The Implications of Sexual Orientation
Conversion Therapy, 33 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC., 260, 260 (noting that proponents of SOCE
reject the notion that same-sex attraction is a normal variant of human sexuality and portray same-sex
attraction as freely chosen and changeable); see also Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, Ferguson v.
JONAH, 136 A.3d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2014) (No. HUDL547312) [hereinafter Complaint and
Jury Demand] (claiming SOCE provider falsely stated that “gay sexual orientation is a mental disorder”
and that sexual orientation is amenable to “treatment”).
15
APA Report, supra note 3, at v (“[S]ame-sex sexual and romantic attractions, feelings, and
behaviors are normal and positive variations of human sexuality regardless of sexual orientation identity
. . . .”); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change Sexual
Orientation, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (2000), http://www.hrc.org/resources/policy-and-positionstatements-on-conversion-therapy (opposing treatment “based upon the assumption that homosexuality
per se is a mental disorder or based upon the a priori assumption that a patient should change his/her
sexual homosexual orientation”); Am. Med. Ass’n, Health Care Needs of the Homosexual Population,
H-160.991, AMA POLICIES ON LGBTQ ISSUES, https://assets.ama-assn.org/sub/meeting/documents/i16resolution-804.pdf 3 (opposing “‘reparative’ or ‘conversion’ therapy for sexual orientation or gender
identity” issues) (last updated 2016); Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Practice Parameter on
Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Sexual Orientation, Gender Nonconformity, and Gender Discordance in
Children and Adolescents, 51 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 957, 968 (2012)
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Today, the nation’s leading medical associations expressly reject the notion
that having same-sex attractions is an illness or disorder.16 In fact, the
American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) decades
ago.17 Now, national mental health professional organizations like the
American Psychological Association (“APA”) describe such behavior and
attractions as “normal and positive variations of human sexuality.”18
Similarly, all mainstream medical and mental health organizations
agree that there is no competent and reliable scientific evidence supporting
the efficacy of conversion therapy.19 In fact, these organizations warn that
such treatment may pose a risk of harm.20 As the APA concluded in the
most comprehensive and definitive review of conversion therapy studies to
date, “efforts to change sexual orientation are unlikely to be successful and
involve some risk of harm.”21
Nonetheless, there remains demand for conversion therapy, especially
among those with strongly held conservative religious views, and a small
but vocal minority of professionals who still endorse the practice.22
(“[T]here is no medically valid basis for attempting to prevent homosexuality, which is not an illness.”).
But see, e.g., NARTH Institute Statement on Sexual Orientation Change, supra note 3 (“[T]he Alliance
remains committed to protecting the rights of clients with unwanted same-sex attractions to pursue
change as well as the rights of clinicians to provide such psychological care.”).
16
Further, the American Medical Association cautions that healthcare providers who begin from the
premise that a patient attracted to the same-sex is disordered risk alienating that patient from other
needed healthcare. See Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 15 at 3 (emphasizing the importance of
“nonjudgmental recognition of patient’s sexual orientations” to ensure “optimal care” for the specific
needs of the LGBTQ population).
17
Compare THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.90 (Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n ed., 3d ed. rev’d. 1987), with THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.0, 380 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n ed., 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]
(listing ego-dystonic homosexuality as a disorder), and THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 302.0 (Am. Psychiatric Ass’n ed., 2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter DSM-II] (first listing
homosexuality as a disorder, then as a milder “sexual orientation disturbance”).
18
APA Report, supra note 3, at v.
19
See The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, HUM. RTS.
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/the-lies-and-dangers-of-reparative-therapy (last visited July
22, 2016) (quoting position statements of fifteen leading professional organizations).
20
See id. Many former participants of SOCE report anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, selfhatred, social isolation and other negative social and emotional consequences. See APA Report, supra
note 3, at 41–42. Such reports are further buttressed by clinical observations that unsuccessful efforts
can result in considerable psychological distress. Id. at 42. See also AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N,
POSITION STATEMENT ON ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY, OR
GENDER EXPRESSION, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (2012), http://www.hrc.org/resources/policy-and-positionstatements-on-conversion-therapy (noting that SOCE “often result[s] in substantial psychological pain
by reinforcing damaging internalized attitudes”).
21
APA Report, supra note 3, at v.
22
See, e.g., NARTH Institute Statement on Sexual Orientation Change, supra note 3 (remaining
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Moreover, while the APA cautions against SOCE23 due to its potential for
harm and the lack of evidence of efficacy, even the APA acknowledges that
some SOCE participants “showed lessened physiological arousal to sexual
stimuli”24 and reported “SOCE was helpful.”25 Even if decreased same-sex
sexual behavior as a result of SOCE is “rare,” as the APA report concludes,
some individuals may wish to try it with full knowledge that the odds of
efficacy are miniscule.26 Further, while there is reason to be concerned that
SOCE may exacerbate internalized sexual stigma or otherwise cause harm
to at least some participants,27 well-conducted empiric studies
demonstrating clear harm caused by SOCE remain lacking.28 As a result,
no state currently limits the provision of SOCE to adults.29
In contrast, as set forth in Section II (B)(1) infra, a growing number of
states and cities are adopting bans on state-licensed health workers
providing SOCE to minors. This raises the question: is there more
conclusive empiric evidence of harm to minors caused by SOCE? The
answer appears to be no.30 As with adults, the overwhelming majority of
“committed to protecting the rights of clients with unwanted same-sex attractions to pursue change as
well as the rights of clinicians to provide such psychological care”); see also APA Report, supra note 3,
at 3–4.
23
Instead of SOCE, the APA recommends “acceptance, support and understanding,” as well as
facilitation of “active coping, social support and identity exploration and development, without imposing
a specific sexual orientation identity outcome.” APA Report, supra note 3, at v. Arguably, the line
between SOCE and providing “active coping” mechanisms for a patient who rejects the same-sex
attractions he or she experiences can be thin. The critical distinction, of course, being that the therapist
is not neutral regarding the sexual orientation outcome in SOCE.
24
In contrast, the APA found that “enduring change to an individual’s sexual orientation is
uncommon.” APA Report, supra note 3, at 3.
25
Id.; see also Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about the Alliance for Therapeutic Choice
and Scientific Integrity (ATCSI) and the NARTH Institute and Homosexuality, supra note 6 (“[T]here are
many individuals who have reported that this type of therapy has provided significant positive benefits
in their lives.”). Those who reported SOCE was helpful said it enabled them to live in a manner
consistent with their faith or provided a sense of community. See APA Report, supra note 3, at 3. The
APA concluded that these same benefits could be provided without risk of harm within an affirming
framework. Id.
26
APA Report, supra note 3, at 3.
27
Id. at 2–3.
28
Certainly, there is ample and concerning anecdotal evidence of harm. Nonetheless, having
rejected anecdotal evidence of successful SOCE—in the face of empirical evidence of long-term
inefficacy—it would seem hypocritical to credit anecdotal evidence of harm. Moreover, even if such
evidence is credited and one assumes that many practices falling within the broad umbrella of SOCE
have caused harm to many participants, it is not yet clear whether all SOCE efforts cause harm to all
participants.
29
Conversion
Therapy
Laws,
MOVEMENT
ADVANCEMENT
PROJECT,
http://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/conversion_therapy (last updated Apr. 7, 2017) (listing
California, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, Nevada, and Connecticut as states that
ban conversion therapy for minors).
30
APA Report, supra note 3, at 72–73 (“There is a lack of published research on SOCE among
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professionals advise against SOCE (with good reason) both because there is
scant evidence of efficacy and ample concern such interventions may cause
serious harm.31 They endorse a more neutral and affirming approach to
minors struggling with their sexual identity or attractions.32 Nonetheless, as
with adults, the risk of harm associated with SOCE, while troubling, does
not currently rest on compelling empiric evidence of causal harm.33
B. Recent Rapid Legal Reforms Limiting Conversion Therapy
1. Legislative Bans
While progress on same-sex marriage has enjoyed more coverage in the
news, legal reforms limiting conversion therapy have also made
overwhelming strides since 2012.34 In that year, California made national
headlines as the first state to ban state-licensed mental health providers
from engaging minors in conversion therapy.35 New Jersey followed suit a
year later, and the District of Columbia the year after that.36
children . . . . We found no empirical research on adolescents who request SOCE.”); see also
Christopher H. Rosik and Michelle A. Cretella, Psychotherapy for Unwanted Homosexual Attraction
Among Youth, AM. C. PEDIATRICIANS BLOG (Jan. 2016), https://www.acpeds.org/the-collegespeaks/position-statements/sexuality-issues/psychotherapy-for-unwanted-homosexual-attraction-amongyouth (“[T]here is no evidence that psychotherapy for [unwanted same-sex attraction] is any more or
less harmful than the use of psychotherapy to treat any other unwanted psychological or behavioral
adaption.”).
31
See, e.g., APA Report, supra note, at 3; Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note 15,
at 968 (2012) (“Given that there is no evidence that efforts to alter sexual orientation are effective,
beneficial, or necessary, and the possibility that they carry the risk of significant harm, such
interventions are contraindicated.”); SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN. OF THE
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV. REPORT, ENDING CONVERSION THERAPY: SUPPORTING AND
AFFIRMING LGBTQ YOUTH 1 (2015) (SOCE “is not supported by credible evidence” and “may put
young people at risk of serious harm”).
32
APA Report, supra note 3, at 5.
33
Of course, the inherent discrimination against sexual minorities implicit in SOCE is concerning, as is the
history of egregious SOCE abuses.
34
While updated, expanded and re-written, a summary of then-current legal reforms was published
in Alexander, supra note 8, at 1.
35
S.B. 1172, 2011–2012, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–
865.2 (West 2013)) (banning state-licensed mental health providers from sexual orientation change
efforts, including gender expression, on persons under eighteen years of age).
36
Assemb. 3371, 215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2013) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54–55
(West 2014)) (banning state-licensed professional counselors, including psychiatrists, from providing
sexual orientation change efforts to persons under eighteen years of age); Act. 20-530, 2013–2014, 20th
Council Sess. (D.C. 2014) (codified at D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015)) (banning state-licensed health
providers from sexual orientation change efforts, including gender identity or expression, on minors).
Most scholarship to date has focused on the interesting circuit split created by the two decisions
considering the constitutionality of these first two state legislative bans. Applying differing legal
standards, the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit United States Courts of Appeal upheld the
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In the past two years, legislation curtailing conversion therapy has
accelerated rapidly. In May 2015, U.S. Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los
Angeles) introduced the first federal bill seeking to limit conversion therapy
nationwide, the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act.37 That same month,
Oregon joined California and New Jersey in prohibiting state-licensed
health professionals from providing such therapy to minors, and Illinois
followed three months later.38 In December 2015, the city of Cincinnati,
Ohio passed the first city ban on conversion therapy.39 Then, on May 25,
2016, Vermont became the fifth state to implement a legislative ban.40
Since then, Seattle, Washington; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Miami, Florida;
and several other cities have adopted a ban.41 In the first half of 2017, New
constitutionality, respectively, of California and New Jersey’s statutes limiting conversion therapy.
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2871 (2014) (holding that the
California statute does not infringe upon providers’ First Amendment rights or violate minor client
parents’ right to make decisions regarding their children); King v. Governor of New Jersey, 767 F.3d
216 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the N.J. statute does not violate licensed counselors’ First Amendment
free speech or free exercise of religion rights); Doe v. Governor of New Jersey, 783 F.3d 150 (3d Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1155 (2016) (holding that the N.J. statute does not violate minor’s First
Amendment right to receive information nor parent’s due process right to direct upbringing of their
child). The Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari, leaving a circuit split regarding two issues.
First, are state statutes that prohibit licensed professionals from providing conversion therapy to minors
regulating conduct or speech? The Ninth Circuit held the statute regulated conduct, finding no First
Amendment protection. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229. The Third Circuit held the statute regulated speech,
finding at least some First Amendment guarantees implicated (but not violated). King, 767 F.3d at 229.
Second, to the extent the statutes are properly considered “professional speech” (upon which this
Article takes no position), there is an additional circuit split regarding the appropriate standard of review
for “professional speech.” The Third Circuit recognizes the longstanding tradition of states regulating
professionals and then analogizes professional speech to commercial speech, deciding that such speech
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 233. Under intermediate scrutiny, limits on
professional speech are permissible when they “directly advance” a “substantial government interest”
and are “not more extensive than [is] necessary to serve that interest.” Id. at 235 (quotations and
citations omitted). Other circuits considering professional speech have applied a lower standard of
review: rational basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Serv. v. Lakey,
667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012). Under this approach, restrictions on professional speech are permissible
as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Connecticut Bar Ass’n v. United
States, 620 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2010).
37
H.R. 2450, 114th Cong. (2015), http://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr2450/BILLS114hr2450ih.pdf. This bill has not yet passed.
38
OR. REV. STAT. § 675.850 (2016) (banning state-licensed providers from sexual orientation or
gender identity change efforts on persons under eighteen); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016)
(banning state-licensed providers from sexual orientation change efforts on persons under eighteen).
39
CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 769-3 (2016).
40
S. 132, 2015–2016, Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2016) (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 18, §§ 8351–8353
(2016)) (banning state-licensed providers from sexual orientation or gender identity change efforts on
persons under eighteen).
41
MIAMI BEACH, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 70-406 (2016); BAY HARBOR ISLANDS, FLA.,
CODE § 23-5.2(b) (2016) (“A person who is licensed by the State of Florida to provide professional
counseling, or who performs counseling as part of his or her professional training under Chapters 458,
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Mexico, Nevada, and Connecticut enacted bans.42 Approximately twenty
other states are considering similar legislation to restrict health providers
from offering conversion therapy to minors.43
2. Administrative Regulation and Interpretative Guidance
New York has taken a different approach to curb conversion therapy,
focusing on administrative regulation and interpretative guidance controlled

459, 490, or 491 of the Florida Statutes, as such chapters may be amended, including, but not limited to,
medical practitioners, osteopathic practitioners, psychologist, psychotherapists, social workers, marriage
and family therapists, and licensed counselors, may not engage in conversion or reparative therapy with
a minor.”); MIAMI, FLA., CODE § 37-13(b) (2016) (“A person who is licensed by the state to provide
professional counseling, or who performs counseling as part of his or her professional training under
F.S. ch. 458, 459, 490, or 491, as such chapters may be amended, including, but not limited to, medical
practitioners, osteopathic practitioners, psychologist, psychotherapists, social workers, marriage and
family therapists, and licensed counselors, may not engage in conversion therapy or reparative therapy
with a minor.”); Official Agenda, NORTH BAY VILLAGE FLA. (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://www.nbvillage.com/Pages/NorthBayFL_Agendas/NorthBayFL_CommissionAgendas/2016-1025%20Village%20Commission%20Meeting%20Agenda.pdf (“The proposed Resolution expresses
support for the movement to prohibit the use of sexual orientation or gender identity change efforts with
minors, including reparative and conversion therapy, which have been demonstrated to be harmful to the
physical and psychological well-being of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons.”);
PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § 628 (2016) (“Ordinance supplementing the Pittsburgh Code, Title VI
Conduct, Article 1 Regulated Rights and Actions, to add a new Section 628 Sexual Orientation or
Gender Identity or Expression Conversion Efforts prohibiting the practice of conversion therapy for
LGBTQIA+ minors within the City of Pittsburgh.”); SEATTLE, WASH., CODE § 14.21.040 (2016) (“It is
a violation for any provider to provide conversion therapy or reparative therapy to a minor, regardless of
whether the provider receives compensation in exchange for such services.”); WEST PALM BEACH, FLA.,
ORDINANCE 4666-16 (2016) (“An ordinance of the City Commission of the City of West Palm Beach,
Florida, amending Chapter 54 (offenses), Article V (reserved) of the Code of Ordinances of the City of
West Palm Beach, Florida, to prohibit the practice of conversion therapy on patients who are minors;
providing a codification clause; providing a conflicts and severability clause, providing an effective
date; and for other purposes.”); WILTON MANORS, FLA., CODE § 12-12 (2016) (“A person who is
licensed by the State of Florida to provide professional counseling, or who performs counseling as part
of his or her professional training under F.S. chs. 458, 459, 490, or 491, as such chapters may be
amended, including, but not limited to, medical practitioners, osteopathic practitioners, psychologists,
psychotherapists, social workers, marriage and family therapists, and licensed counselors, may not
engage in conversion or reparative therapy with a minor.”).
42
S.B. 121, 2016-2017, Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2017) (banning certain health professionals from providing
conversion therapy to persons under age 18); S.B. 201, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017) (“A psychotherapist shall not
provide any conversion therapy to a person who is under 18 years of age regardless of the willingness of the
person or his or her parent or legal guardian to authorize such therapy.” But not prohibiting “licensed health care
professionals from engaging in expressive speech or religious counseling . . . .”); 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, §§ 2–3
(Reg. Sess) (“No health care provider shall engage in conversion therapy . . . . It shall be unlawful for any person
who practices or administers conversion therapy to practice or administer such therapy while in the conduct of
trade or commerce.”).
43
See Active Laws & Legislation: The Details, NAT’L CTR. LESBIAN RTS. (last visited June 22,
2017), http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws-legislation-by-state/.
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by the executive branch.44 New York’s approach has three primary
components. First, in February 2016, the New York State Department of
Health issued a “Policy & Billing Guidance” in its Medicaid Update
clarifying that Medicaid does not cover conversion therapy under fee-forservice or managed care Medicaid.45 The Guidance expressly provides that
conversion therapy is not covered because “homosexuality is not considered
a medical condition that requires treatment.”46 Interestingly, unlike the
legislative bans, New York’s refusal to cover conversion therapy applies
regardless of age and is not limited to minors.47 Second, in April 2016, the
New York State Office of Mental Health amended its mental health
regulations to prohibit state facilities from providing services to minors that
are intended to change the minor’s sexual orientation.48 Third, later in
2016, the New York State Department of Financial Services adopted a new
insurance regulation that prohibits insurance coverage for conversion
therapy to minors by mental health professionals.49 Through these
administrative changes, New York effectively prohibits public insurance
from funding conversion therapy for anyone, bars state facilities from being
used for conversion therapy on minors, and bans private insurance coverage
of conversion therapy for minors.50
3. Judicial Remedy: Consumer Protection Litigation
Meanwhile, consumers and their advocates have launched another front
against sexual orientation change efforts, focusing on consumer protectionoriented attacks.51 One day before the landmark United States Supreme

44
New York does not currently ban state-licensed professionals from providing conversion therapy,
although such legislation has been proposed in the past. See id.
45
New York Medicaid Does Not Cover “Conversion Therapy”, MEDICAID UPDATE (N.Y. St. Dep’t.
of Health, Albany, N.Y.), Feb. 2016, at 1, 10 [hereinafter N.Y. St. Dep’t. of Health].
46
Id. at 10.
47
Laila Kearney, New York Bans Insurance Coverage of LGBT ‘Conversion Therapy’, REUTERS
(Feb. 6, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/new-york-lgbt-idUSL2N15L0HW.
48
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.8(d) (2016) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of this
section, no facility shall provide services to minor patients that are intended to change such minor’s
sexual orientation or gender identity . . . .”).
49
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 52.16(n)(2) (2016) (“No policy or certificate shall
provide coverage for conversion therapy rendered by a mental health professional to an individual under
the age of 18 years.”).
50
Id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14 § 527.8(d); Kearney, supra note 47. Connecticut’s
legislative ban adopts a similar strategy, prohibiting public funds from being expended to practice, to
provide a referral, or to provide benefits for conversion therapy on minors. 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 4
(Reg. Sess.).
51
Consumer protection attacks generally argue that SOCE practices are deceptive either because (1) same
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Court decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,
Obergefell v. Hodges, on June 25, 2015, a New Jersey jury vindicated
another important right for sexual minorities.52 In Ferguson v. JONAH, a
jury returned a verdict finding that a faith-based organization advertising
and selling conversion therapy services violated New Jersey’s consumer
fraud act.53 The jury concluded that the faith-based organization, JONAH,
and other defendants acting therewith “made misrepresentations in
connection with the advertisement, sale or subsequent performance of the
JONAH program and engaged in unconscionable commercial practices.”54
The JONAH case appears to have precipitated a trend toward more
consumer protection-oriented attacks on sexual orientation change efforts at
the state and federal levels. Shortly after the JONAH verdict, in August
2015, Illinois became the fourth state to restrict conversion therapy and the
first state to expressly provide a private right of action for consumer fraud
based on the so-called therapy.55 Then, on February 10, 2016, four
members of Congress asked the Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) to regulate conversion therapy as part of the FTC’s
mandate to restrict “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”56 Later that same month, three human rights organizations
jointly filed a Complaint with the FTC asking the Commission to
investigate and take enforcement action to stop an organization, People Can
Change, Inc., from advertising and providing conversion therapy services.57
sex attraction is not a medical disorder, or (2) because there is no evidence that SOCE can change a participant’s
sexual orientation.
52
See Order Granting Permanent Injunctive Relief and Awarding Attorneys Fees at 2, Ferguson v.
JONAH, 136 A.3d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 18, 2015) (No. HUDL547312) [hereinafter Order]. See
also Jury in Groundbreaking SPLC Suit Finds Gay ‘Conversion’ Program is Unconscionable and Fraudulent,
S. POVERTY L. CTR. (June 24, 2015), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2015/06/25/jury-groundbreaking-splcsuit-finds-gay-‘conversion’-program-unconscionable-and-fraudulent.
53
Jury in Groundbreaking SPLC Suit Finds Gay ‘Conversion’ Program is Unconscionable and
Fraudulent, supra note 52.
54
Order, supra note 52, at 2.
55
405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 25 (West 2016) (“No person or entity may . . . use or employ any
deception . . . offering conversion therapy services in a manner that represents homosexuality as a
mental disease . . . . A violation of this Section constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.”).
56
Letter from Patty Murray et al., to Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-ftc-gay-conversion-therapy_us_56bb6402e4b0c3c5504f9574;
Mollie Reilly, Members of Congress Urge Ban on Gay Conversion Therapy, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10,
2016,
12:20
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-ftc-gay-conversion-therapy_us_
56bb6402e4b0c3c5504f9574 (internal quotations omitted).
57
Complaint for Action to Stop False, Deceptive Advertising and Other Business Practices at 1,
Human Rights Campaign v. People Can Change, Inc. (Feb. 2016), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/FTC-ConversionTherapy-Complaint-Final.pdf
[hereinafter
FTC Complaint].
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The FTC Complaint alleged that the organization’s advertisements
constituted unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices.58 Most
recently, Connecticut made it a violation of that state’s unfair or deceptive
trade practices act to provide conversion therapy to a minor in the conduct
of trade or commerce.59
Recognizing the three different approaches to address conversion
therapy (legislative, executive, and judicial), as well as the many
permutations within each, this Article begins to make recommendations on
a comprehensive strategy. The first step in this regard, however, is to
identify concerns with existing legislative bans on state-licensed healthcare
workers providing conversion therapy to minors.
III. HEALTH PROVIDER BANS ON SOCE FOR MINORS ARE
BAD HEALTH POLICY
After a history of de jure and de facto discrimination against sexual
minorities and of stomach-turning abuses associated with some conversion
therapy efforts, at first blush, passage of legislative bans on state-licensed
healthcare workers providing SOCE to minors may seem like cause for
celebration.60 Such legislation appears to recognize that attempting to
change sexual orientation to conform to hetero-normative ideals is not in
the best interest of minors. Expressively, SOCE bans arguably counter
historic stigma by declaring that same-sex attraction is not a disease or
disorder meriting medical treatment. Similarly, such legislation counters
the notion that same-sex attraction is a choice that therapeutic efforts can
alter.61 Closer analysis, however, raises concerns with this well-intentioned
approach.

58

Id.
2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 3 (Reg. Sess.) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who practices or administers
conversion therapy [to minors] to practice or administer such therapy while in the conduct of trade or
commerce…[to do so] shall be considered an unfair or deceptive trade practice . . . .”).
60
In fact, when I first wrote on the promise of consumer protection based strategies to combat the
abuses of SOCE, I saw such litigation as complimenting legislative bans rather than in lieu thereof. See
Alexander, supra note 8, at 3. It was only after further study and thought that I became troubled that
health provider bans do more harm than good.
61
Most individuals experience little or no sense of choice over sexual orientation. See AM.
PSYCHOL. ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS: FOR A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND HOMOSEXUALITY 2 (2008) [hereinafter “APA Q&A”]. As a result, many refer to
sexual orientation as “immutable.” Even among those who oppose SOCE, however, some contest
immutability, arguing that for some individuals, attractions are more fluid and change naturally over
time.
59
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A. The Narrow Scope of Bans Makes Them Ineffective and Possibly
Harmful
Bans are grossly under-inclusive if the goal is to combat any abuses
associated with SOCE. All legislative bans on SOCE to date are limited to
minors.62 They do not apply in any way to the overwhelming majority of
people who might seek SOCE.63 Instead, bans only curtail the provision of
services to those under the age of eighteen.64 This relatively young age
parameter means that legislative bans are wholly irrelevant to most potential
SOCE participants.
Moreover, the selected age, eighteen, is too young to enable bans to
effectively provide many of the desired benefits.65 Identity exploration
typically continues for several more years.66 So, bans are not well targeted
if their goal is to prohibit SOCE until individuals have a more stable sense
of identity. Likewise, to the extent bans hope to avoid parental coercion to
participate, they have a timing problem. At age eighteen, most adolescents
are still living at home, financially and emotionally dependent on their
parents, and have not yet graduated from high school.67 Bans no longer
apply before the most significant threat of parental coercion ends.68

62
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. §
675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–8353 (2016); S.B. 121, 2016–2017, Reg. Sess. (N.M.
2017); S.B. 201, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017); 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5 (Reg. Sess.).
63
See APA Report, supra note 3, at 3 (most SOCE research participants are adults).
64
States likely adopted the age eighteen because they have a more compelling state interest in
protecting the health and welfare of minors than adults. So, bans are more likely to survive
constitutional scrutiny when limited to minors. While such constitutional analysis is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is worth noting that there is at least some question of whether bans, without any
possibility of judicial by-pass or mature minor consent, violate substantive due process. See Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that blanket parental consent
requirement for minor’s abortion, without possibility of judicial by-pass or mature minor consent, is
unconstitutional); see also Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 Duke L.J. 1295
(2015) (arguing in favor of recognizing a child’s constitutional right to bodily integrity which includes
the right to autonomy in medical decision-making and the right to protection against bodily harm). But
see Doe v. Governor of New Jersey, 783 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1155 (2016)
(upholding constitutionality of New Jersey ban).
65
See Sanam Assil, Note, Can You Work It? Or Flip It and Reverse It?: Protecting LGBT Youth
from Sexual Orientation Change Efforts, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 551 (2015) (arguing that SOCE
bans should extend to twenty-one years old to enable potential participants to reach greater emotional
maturity).
66
APA Report, supra note 3, at 77 (“[Minors] are in the midst of developmental processes in which the
ultimate outcome is unknown.”).
67
Id. (“[Minors are] emotionally and financially dependent on adults.”).
68
Concerns about potential parental coercion, while troubling, are better addressed through
requiring robust minor assent and mature minor consent or even judicial by-pass rather than through
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Even for those under eighteen, health provider bans are inadequate
because of their narrow scope and the resulting unintended, negative
incentive structure. Such bans do not stop anyone from participating in
SOCE or from being coerced to participate in SOCE. Instead, they merely
drive minor SOCE participants to unlicensed, non-healthcare providers who
are not restricted in any way.69 The failure to limit non-licensed providers
makes bans, at best, ineffective and at worst, harmful.70 After all, many
abuses reported in relation to SOCE today are associated with organizations
that utilize “religious,” non-healthcare providers.71 Health provider bans do
nothing to address the egregious, exploitative, and unprofessional
blanket legislative bans which fail to account for individual needs, as discussed in Section III (D) infra.
69
Most bans only restrict state-licensed healthcare providers. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 8351 – 8353 (2016); S.B. 121, 2016-2017, Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2017); S.B. 201, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). But see
2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, §§ 2–3 (Reg. Sess.) (also banning provision of SOCE to minors by any provider “while in
the conduct of trade or commerce.”). Of course, health provider bans may effectively deter or delay some
participants. However, those who are not deterred or delayed will seek SOCE from untrained,
unmonitored, non-healthcare providers at increased risk of harm. See Section II(C) infra for a more
detailed discussion.
70
States likely limited bans to state-licensed health providers at least in part because many nonhealthcare providers of SOCE are religiously affiliated. Religious freedom is constitutionally protected
by the First Amendment, as well as by federal and state laws. The need to respect religious freedom
makes it considerably more challenging for states to regulate non-healthcare SOCE providers.
However, the failure to regulate all providers dramatically changes the practical effect of health provider
bans.
The Supreme Court appears likely to offer new guidance on the balance between free speech and
free exercise rights, on one hand, and state’s desire to protect equal rights, on the other, during its next
term in Masterpiece Cake, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. No. 16-11 (2017). This
precedent may eventually enable states to craft broader legislative bans on SOCE without fear of
constitutional challenge.
71
For example, unlicensed, “religious,” non-healthcare providers staffed the “sadistic Christian
bootcamps” reported in Alabama that ultimately led to three child abuse convictions. Art Levine, The
Harrowing Story of Life Inside Alabama’s Most Sadistic Christian Bootcamp, NEWSWEEK (March 2,
2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/2017/03/10/saving-youth-foundation-alabama-christian-schoolbeatings-nudity-562257.html; Pete Madden, Brian Epstein, and Brian Ross, Alabama Legislation Stops
Short of Banning Sexual Orientation ‘Conversion Therapy’, ABC NEWS (June 15, 2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/alabama-legislation-stops-short-banning-sexual-orientationconversion/story?id=47984624; Brian Epstein and Brian Ross, Alabama State Lawmaker Seeks
Crackdown on Troubled Youth Programs After ABC News Report, ABC NEWS (March 17, 2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/alabama-state-lawmaker-seeks-crackdown-troubled-youthprograms/story?id=46181915. Moreover, JONAH (before the lawsuit effectively dismantled it) and
People Can Change (now known as Brothers Road) are alleged to have engaged in deceptive practices
and to utilize some unlicensed, “religious,” non-healthcare providers. See FTC Complaint, supra note
57, at 2. But see NAT’L TASK FORCE FOR THERAPY EQUALITY, REPORT TO F.T.C., IN THEIR OWN
WORDS: LIES DECEPTION AND FRAUD (2017), https://www.voiceofthevoiceless.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/In-Their-Own-Words-Lies-Deception-and-Fraud-National-Task-ForceComplaint-to-the-Federal-Trade-Commission.pdf.
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practices—like requiring participants to undress and touch their genitals in
front of a mirror while a “counselor” watches—reported in the JONAH
case.72
As a potential solution, health provider bans are woefully deficient.
Only under the narrowest of circumstances and in the smallest of ways do
they decrease access to SOCE, as bans provide no limit to any participant
age eighteen or older or to many providers regardless of participant age. 73
Nonetheless, even a small step forward can be important. So, the question
becomes whether bans present an actual step forward. One way in which
they might is through making important expressive statements that could
decrease the stigma of same-sex attraction or provide broader deterrence
than the actual scope of the bans.74
B. Limiting Bans to Minors Undercuts Any Potential Expressive Benefits
There are several possible expressive benefits to legislative bans on
SOCE.
1. Bans as Warnings
First, by banning SOCE, states go from neutrality to a statement that
SOCE is unnecessary, ineffective, and potentially harmful. Bans warn
potential participants that SOCE is a bad choice, different from other
healthcare alternatives.75 This legislative expression seems likely to deter
some potential participants from selecting SOCE (even if allowed to
choose).76

72

Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 14, at 46.
See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d. 1208, 1232 n.8 (9th Cir. 2013).
74
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2021
(1996) (analyzing the expressive function of law and arguing that law can play a positive role changing
social norms so long as the consequence of the law is also positive); see also Cynthia Lee & Peter
Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronormativity, and the Murder of Transgender
Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 120 (2014) (arguing a ban on the trans panic defense would serve an
important expressive function, sending “a loud and clear message that our society abhors this kind of
violence”); Charity Scott, Why Law Pervades Medicine: An Essay on Ethics in Health Care, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y (2000) (finding law may serve as a consensus statement of socially
agreed upon, but not unanimous, values).
75
See Sunstein, supra note 74, at 2034–35 (recognizing potential value in laws as expressive tools
that help to change social norms, like not smoking, and thereby improve health through “informationinduced norm cascades”).
76
While the expressive statement of laws can be important, it should also be acknowledged that
laws only change social norms or deter people to the extent that people are aware of the content of the laws.
73
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2. Bans as Distancing State Sponsorship
Second, bans may also serve another important expressive purpose by
distancing state sponsorship from SOCE practices. Many states have a
history of de jure discrimination against sexual minorities and same-sex
sexual conduct.77 Legislative bans that limit “state-licensed” providers
arguably distance state sponsorship from SOCE practices that many view as
reinforcing discriminatory stigmas against sexual minorities. In this way,
bans can be seen as an attempt to limit further state complicity in
discrimination. Bans may be seen as an important step towards addressing
lingering structural violence, stemming at least in part from past de jure
discrimination.78
Limiting state-licensed health providers may also be viewed as an
attempt to remove the cloak of authority from SOCE providers. By
restricting state-licensed healthcare workers from providing SOCE, the state
is refusing to allow the legitimacy it confers through state licensing to be
used for practices it deems pernicious. Even without a history of state
sponsored discrimination, this sort of distancing arguably serves a valuable
purpose.
3. Bans as De-Medicalization
Third, because most bans only apply to licensed health providers, bans
also arguably express the view that being a sexual minority or having samesex attractions is not a medical condition.79 Again, this distancing attempts
to break a historically created stigma, since mainstream medical
organizations once characterized same-sex attraction as disordered.80 By

77
Before the 1960’s, consensual sodomy was a felony in every state. See Margot Canaday, We
Colonials:
Sodomy
Laws
in
America,
THE
NATION
(Sept.
3,
2008),
https://www.thenation.com/article/we-colonials-sodomy-laws-america/.
78
See Alberto B. Lopez, Forty Yeas and Five Nays – The Nays Have It: Morrison’s Blurred
Political Accountability and the Defeat of the Civil Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act,
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 251, 291 (2001) (noting the important “symbolic value of the law” to distance
the state from past discrimination).
79
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–8353 (2016). In contrast, clergy and other nonmedical providers remain free to offer SOCE.
80
See DSM-III supra note 17 (listing ego-dystonic homosexuality as a disorder); DSM-II supra
note 17 (first listing homosexuality as a “disorder” then as a milder “sexual orientation disturbance”);
see also Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity in Aging, 32 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 21–
22 (2009) (discussing how stigma shapes self-image and relationship with the medical profession when
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prohibiting licensed health providers from offering SOCE to minors, states
limit the “same-sex attraction disorder” diagnosis and treatment that
devalues sexual minorities.81 In this way, bans reinforce the dignity of all
sexual minorities, even those who never consider SOCE.82
4. Not a Matter of Maturity: Limiting Bans to Minors Undoes Most, If Not
All, Expressive Benefit
Unfortunately, any potential expressive benefit from current legislative
bans on SOCE is greatly undercut, if not altogether eliminated, by the fact
that such bans only limit the provision of SOCE to minors under the age of
eighteen.83 Sadly, this limitation suggests that SOCE is appropriate for
those old enough to handle it. This age-limitation also implies that
providing SOCE is (still) medically appropriate, even for state-licensed
health providers. Because the age-limitation eviscerates most, if not all, of
the potential expressive benefit of legislative bans, the question becomes:
what other consequences may result from bans?
C. Health Provider Bans Drive SOCE to Untrained, Unmonitored, Less
Accountable Providers
One troubling unintended consequence is that bans are likely to drive
SOCE participants to unsafe providers.84 While bans may deter or delay
some minors from seeking SOCE, those who continue to demand
conversion therapy will be forced to seek services from people who are not
homosexuality is classified as a mental disorder); Edward Stein, Mutability and Innateness Arguments
about Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 625 (2014) (describing how demedicalization of homosexuality has decreased stigma).
81
This pernicious diagnosis undermines the dignity of sexual minorities and perpetuates and
reinforces stigma and discrimination against them. Even well-intended medically-based sexual
orientation change efforts may be seen as in tension with non-discrimination principles, at least to the
extent they rest on the insidious premise that having same-sex attractions is medically disordered.
82
While health provider bans are not as explicit as New York’s Guidance, they arguably serve the
same purpose. See N.Y. St. Dep’t. of Health, supra note 45, at 1, 10 (“[H]omosexuality is not
considered a medical condition that requires treatment.”).
83
The positive expressive message of a blanket ban on SOCE for all would be compelling.
However, for the reasons set forth in Section III infra, health provider bans, are bad health policy.
Additionally, states have other more targeted ways to provide a beneficial expressive message, without
undermining autonomy and driving SOCE participants to higher risk providers.
84
Bans also seem likely to drive SOCE participants to other states without bans and without a commitment
to sexual minority rights. Already in Alabama’s case, there is evidence of conservative religious parents sending
their children across state lines to seek unlicensed, “religious” residential therapy. See, e.g., Levine, supra note
71; Madden, supra note 71; Epstein, supra note 71. Minors are particularly vulnerable when isolated in rural
areas of states that largely oppose sexual minority rights.
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licensed health providers.85 Because bans limit access to professional
health providers but do little to decrease demand, they effectively drive
SOCE to untrained, unmonitored, and less accountable providers.86 Given
the importance of accountability, education, and ethics, prohibitions on
allowing licensed healthcare workers to provide SOCE will almost certainly
result in those minors participating in SOCE facing a greater risk of harm.87
After all, states monitor licensed health providers.88 States do not have
an equivalent monitoring system for unlicensed SOCE providers.89 In fact,
many abuses reported in relation to SOCE today are associated with
organizations that utilize unlicensed providers.90 Most current SOCE bans
do nothing to address reported exploitative practices of certain unlicensed
providers, whose practices are outside even a minority standard of care for
any medical professional.91 Without state monitoring systems that provide
some accountability for state-licensed healthcare workers, abusive SOCE
practices are less likely to be identified and stopped.92
State licensing also creates leverage for accountability. It creates an
incentive for better self-regulation. If state-licensed healthcare workers
value their license, they will be hesitant to deviate too far from the standard
85
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–8353 (2016); 2017 N.M. Laws 132. Connecticut’s
ban goes beyond licensed health providers and restricts the provision of conversion therapy to minors by
any person in the conduct of “trade or commerce,” but even this ban would allow minors to immediately
seek conversion therapy from non-paid providers. 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, (Reg. Sess.).
86
While bans may cause some minors (or their parents) to reassess SOCE and to instead seek
recommended sexual orientation outcome-neutral therapeutic approaches or to wait until age eighteen,
some minors desiring SOCE, who would have sought SOCE from a medical professional, will now do
so from someone without the same education, training, and experience (and likely with different goals).
87
It should be conceded, however, that there is currently no empirical evidence quantifying (or even
validating) this increased risk.
88
See Victor, supra note 8, at 1554 (describing state monitoring of licensed providers and arguing
in favor of relying on censure of SOCE therapists for making deceptive promises in advertising and for
making unrealistic guarantees to their patients).
89
See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d. 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 2013).
90
See, e.g., Levine, supra note 71 (describing a “Christian” residential camp providing SOCE that
utilized isolation, shackles, and beating on minors); Madden, supra note 71; Epstein, supra note 71;
FTC Complaint, supra note 57, at 2; Order, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 45–46.
91
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–8353 (2016).
92
See June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical
Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 518 (2006) (One
risk of prohibition is that a state “loses control of the activity altogether. If the demand remains
sufficiently high, black markets develop, within or without the jurisdiction, that evade effective state
regulation.”).
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of care in the provision of services to avoid losing their license or facing
other discipline. In this way, licensing deters the provision of harmful or
abusive practices.
Moreover, if monitoring and deterring fail on the front end, state
licensing systems also offer an additional mechanism of redress against
unscrupulous SOCE practitioners.93 Anyone concerned with the care
provided by a state-licensed health worker has the additional (and often
more efficient and less costly) alternative of pursuing state administrative
sanction against the provider, as well as any civil litigation remedies.94
When SOCE providers are unlicensed, participants lose this potential
avenue of redress and providers are less accountable.
Further, if demand for SOCE remains and begins to be met solely by
unlicensed, non-healthcare providers, SOCE participants will almost
certainly face a greater risk of harm. Unlicensed, non-healthcare providers
typically lack the medical education and training licensed providers
receive.95 Without adequate education and training, even well intentioned
SOCE providers are less likely to help and more likely to harm participants.
They simply lack relevant knowledge, training, and experience.
Unlicensed providers may also have different goals for treatment.
Doctors and many other mental health professionals take an oath to work to
the best of their ability to heal their patients.96 Non-healthcare providers do
not and may be more likely to be motivated primarily by reinforcing heteronormative moral ideologies than by healing.97 Because monitoring,
accountability, education, and ethics are critical to quality healthcare, as
long as demand for SOCE persists, bans are more likely to imperil minors
seeking SOCE than to protect them.98

93
See Victor, supra note 8, at 1535; see also, e.g., David Orentlicher, The Influence of a
Professional Organization on Physician Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 592 (1994) (noting how state
licensing boards hold members accountable for violations of medical ethics).
94
Victor, supra note 8, at 1574.
95
Credentialing,
Licensing,
and
Education,
NCCIH
(Oct.
2015),
https://nccih.nih.gov/health/decisions/credentialing.htm.
96
Even without an oath, professional health providers have professional ethical obligations that
encourage them to focus on healing. In contrast, “religious” providers offering SOCE may be focused
on preserving moral ideals, without regard to the health consequences for an individual patient.
97
See APA Report, supra note 3, at 12.
98
The history of restrictions on abortion teaches that restricting access to a healthcare service,
without curtailing demand, drives desperate seekers to less safe and less accountable providers with
detrimental health outcomes.
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D. Bans Undermine Autonomy, Endangering Health
Health provider bans are also bad health policy because they create a
restriction on access to desired care available to adults. In doing so, they
strip choice from the traditional decision-makers (doctors and patients)
without regard to individualized circumstance and endanger the mature
minor doctrine.
1. Bans Usurp Professional Self-Regulation
SOCE bans deviate, without adequate justification, from the traditional
deference accorded to the medical profession for self-regulation.99
Generally, medical professionals largely self-regulate what manner of
health care to offer patients.100 They do so primarily through setting
standards of care, issuing position statements, and (in conjunction with the
state) controlling licensing and policing of the professional practice.101
While imperfect, this system of deference makes sense, as medical
professionals have substantially more healthcare education and experience
than state legislators.102 In all but rare instances, medical professionals are
better situated than state legislatures to serve as decision makers regarding
the type of care that is appropriate to offer patients.103

99
There may seem to be a tension between acknowledging that having same-sex attractions is not a
medical condition meriting treatment and categorizing SOCE as healthcare. However, many individuals
experiencing internal dissonance over same-sex attractions desire assistance from a mental health
professional. Moreover, even the medical organizations that counsel against SOCE consider it
appropriate for a therapist to provide “active coping” mechanisms and to facilitate “identity
exploration.” See APA Report, supra note 3, at v (recommending “active coping” and “identity
exploration”). The controversy over SOCE is that the therapist is not neutral regarding the sexual
orientation outcome. All mainstream professional organizations continue to see a role for medical
professionals to play in sexual orientation identity exploration, simply in a neutral and affirming
capacity.
100
See, e.g., Joshua E. Perry, Physician-Owned Specialty Hospitals and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act: Health Care Reform at the Intersection of Law and Ethics, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 369,
416 (2012) (“[T]he medical profession has historically been self-regulated by codes of ethics and
commitments to professionalism.”). Self-regulation has limits, of course. It is well established that
legislatures retain the power to regulate licensed healthcare professionals when necessary for the benefit
of the public’s health, safety, and welfare. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122–23
(1889).
101
They are then accountable through professional malpractice liability or discipline.
102
Certainly, history is replete with examples, like castration for conversion therapy, where the
medical professionals got it wrong. However, history is similarly replete with legislative actions, like
forced sterilization, that were wrong. Absent conflict of interest, there is no reason to believe that
legislatures will do better than trained and experienced health professionals.
103
See, e.g., Andrew Fichter, The Law of Doctoring: A Study of the Codification of Medical
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2. Bans Usurp Patient Autonomy, Harming Overall Health
Bans also deviate, without adequate justification, from traditional
deference to patient decision-making. Experts widely endorse autonomy in
medical decision-making because healthcare decisions primarily impact the
patient and do not harm others and because patients express wide variation
in preferences for care.104 Care, such as gender confirming surgery,
demonstrates the broad range of needs, values, and experiences individuals
have in realizing health. Sometimes, a small minority of patients benefit
from care that would be contrary to the best interest of most patients.
Consequently, it is important not to strip decision-making authority from
competent, informed individuals and their health providers without
overwhelming evidence that the care would be harmful to all those
demanding it.
Variation in patient preference seems likely to be especially pronounced
in the context of SOCE, which is often closely tied to religious or moral
beliefs.105 In fact, it is indisputable that some individuals value access to
SOCE, even if SOCE cannot change sexual orientation.106 There are
several potentially valid reasons for the seeming disjunction between
efficacy and demand.107 Some may view SOCE as part of their personal
Professionalism, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 317, 341 (2009) (“Because the medical profession is functionally
specific, and because its subject matter is abstruse and requires extensive training . . . , the medical
profession is entitled to, and in fact must regulate itself.”); Bratislav Stankovic, “It’s a Designer Baby!”:
Opinions on Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 55 (2005)
(“The medical profession is far better situated to self-regulate health practices, including morally
debatable ones.”).
104
See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (7th
ed. 2013) (arguing that dilemmas in bioethics should be resolved by applying the principles of
autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice). Over time, experts have come to accept that
different patients define beneficence very differently. The individualized nature of defining beneficence
makes autonomy critical. See Benjamin Moulton and Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical
Decision Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 89–90 (2012)
(demonstrating how studies show wide variation in patient preferences, tipping the balance in favor of
autonomy for healthcare decision-making).
105
APA Report, supra note 3 (noting that most SOCE research participants are well-educated, adult,
white males, “who consider religion to be an extremely important part of their lives and participate in
traditional or conservative faiths (i.e. The Church of Latter-Day Saints, evangelical Christianity, and
Orthodox Judaism).”).
106
Id.
107
There are potentially troubling reasons for this disjunction as well, such as internalized stigma
and inadequate informed consent. This Article suggests that states should address informed consent
directly, rather than through bans, and combat stigma, at least indirectly, through consumer protectionbased accountability and defunding SOCE. See infra Section IV. Demand driven by internalized social
stigma is virtually impossible to address directly without abandoning all semblance of respect for
autonomy. There simply is no way to effectively differentiate corrupting societal influence from
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road to self-acceptance.108 Others may want to participate—even absent
any coercive influence—to assuage their parents or other family
members.109 Still more may hope to temporarily buy time with decreased
frequency or intensity of same-sex attractions (even if unlikely), until they
can graduate, move out of their parents’ house, move to a more tolerant
city, or find another job.
Of course, the real question is not so much whether SOCE could ever
be beneficial to anyone, but who gets to decide whether or not statelicensed health providers may offer it as an alternative. Generally,
healthcare providers determine what services to offer, and competent adults
select among care options in consultation with the provider. This deference
to doctor-patient decision-making extends to practices that have no medical
benefit and entail some risk of serious harm, like elective cosmetic
surgery.110 SOCE arguably falls within such category of practices, and no
state has restricted the provision of SOCE to adults.111
The default preference for autonomy in medical decision-making
recognizes that doctors have the best expertise regarding what healthcare
alternatives should be offered, and that patients have the best knowledge
regarding how their values weigh potential risks and benefits of available
alternatives. Legislators lack the doctor’s expertise and the patient’s
personal knowledge. So, it is rare for them to play a desirable role in
healthcare decision-making.
The same reasoning also applies to minors’ healthcare decision making.
Generally, experts consider autonomy to be a fundamental tenet of just and
appropriate health policy and practice, even for minors.112 However,
differences in preferences and values.
108
Even if it does not “work,” it may help some individuals to be able to tell themselves that they
tried everything before accepting their same-sex attractions.
109
In this way, SOCE could conceivably help to avoid early familial rejection, with its deleterious
consequences.
110
S.R. Mousavi, The Ethics of Aesthetic Surgery, 3 J. CUTANEOUS & AESTHETIC SURGERY 38, 38
(2010) (“In general, competent adults have the right to decide whether they wish to undergo a surgical
procedure or not . . . [even] where patients are not suffering from any ‘illness’ . . . [and surgery] may
lead to long-term adverse effects on body function and health.”).
111
Conversion Therapy Laws, supra note 29.
112
See, e.g., Chapter 2: Opinions on Consent, Communication & Decision Making, AM. MED. ASS’N
7 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter2.pdf (“Physicians who treat minors have an ethical duty to promote the developing autonomy of minor
patients by involving children in making decisions about their health care to a degree commensurate
with the child’s abilities.”); Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents:
Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 39 (2012) (arguing that developing
a doctrine surrounding minors’ rights to bodily integrity “would be highly desirable and beneficial to
both health care providers and to minors”); Aviva L. Katz & Sally A. Webb, Informed Consent in
Decision-Making Pediatric Practice, 138 PEDIATRICS 1, 5 (2016) (“Physicians should involve pediatric
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minors may exercise healthcare decision-making autonomy differently than
adults. Minors typically consent to medical care in one of three ways: (1)
directly, (2) through parental consent,113 or (3) through judicial by-pass.114
Utilizing these consent mechanisms, minors enjoy virtually the same array
of healthcare choices as adults.
As compared to the legislature, the case for patient autonomy in
healthcare decision-making remains strong even when applied to minors,
although perhaps not as strong as in the case of adults.115 Because minors’
preferences and values are still developing, states often assert a heightened
state interest in protecting them.116 This state interest usually lies dormant,
however, because states recognize that parents generally provide the best
surrogate decision maker for their minor children.117 In fact, outside the
“mature minor” doctrine,118 parents are the default healthcare decisionmakers for their children, and states usually only interfere with parental
decision-making authority when a child’s life, welfare, or “best interests”
are threatened.119
patients in their health care decision-making by providing information on their illness and options for
diagnosis and treatment in a developmentally appropriate manner and seeking assent to medical care
whenever appropriate.”).
113
Parental consent is often coupled with minor assent.
114
Judicial by-pass is a relatively rare consent mechanism whereby courts provide consent to care
for minors by making an individualized finding that such care is in the minor’s “best interests.” Judicial
by-pass arises as a procedural safeguard when parents select certain controversial treatments for a minor,
when parents refuse to consent to care in the minor’s best interest (and the minor lacks the right or
refuses to consent directly), or when other conflict arises. For example, some states require parents to seek
judicial approval before sterilizing a minor. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 25.5-10-231. One benefit of judicial
by-pass is that it entails an individualized determination of what is in the minor’s best interests.
115
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Legal and Psychological Considerations in Adolescents’ End-of-Life Choices,
110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 33, 42 (2015) (“Although adolescents vary in terms of their cognitive maturity, there
are important reasons to give adolescents a broader voice in their healthcare decision making, including
recognition of the adolescent’s personal autonomy, freedom, and dignity.”).
116
See Carey v. Population, 431 U.S. 678, 693, 702 (1977) (striking down a statute prohibiting
distribution of contraception to minors, while recognizing a “significant state interest” in protecting
minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (holding that states have authority to
override parental decision-making when a child’s life, welfare, or “best interests” are threatened).
117
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of
Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
118
This Article uses the term “mature minor doctrine” to refer generally to laws that allow
adolescents under the age of 18 to consent to medical care, whether or not such laws are limited in scope
and whether or not the laws require a finding of maturity. Experts use the term “mature minor doctrine”
in myriad different ways, sometimes as a legal term and other times as an ethical term. Some experts
consider the “special spheres” consent discussed infra to be distinct from the mature minor doctrine;
others describe special spheres as a limited application of the mature minor doctrine. This Article treats
special sphere as a sub-set of the mature minor doctrine. Using this definition, while the scope and
exceptions vary widely, all fifty states recognize some version of the mature minor doctrine. See Iltis,
supra note 10 (documenting the trend toward expansion of the mature minor doctrine).
119
Iltis, supra note 10, at 333. States also interfere if they determine that a parent is unfit.
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While minors may still be developing, their healthcare preferences are
already entitled to weight.120 Like adults, minors face the consequences of
their healthcare decisions, and research suggests some adolescents are
capable of making healthcare decisions comparable to adults.121
Particularly in the context of sexual and mental health, experts recognize
the importance of granting decision-making authority to “mature minors,”
as any other consent requirement poses a detrimental barrier to care.122 So,
although respect for individual preferences and values is complicated by the
still-developing nature of minors and the state’s heightened interest in
protecting them, autonomy (at least vis a vis the legislature) remains the
default for healthcare decision making for minors.123
In a significant deviation from this norm, legislative bans on SOCE
strip minors of the ability to consent to care directly, through their parents,
or even through judicial bypass. This absolute restriction on access to
professional care available to adults is virtually unprecedented.124 It is also
120
See, e.g., Chapter 2: Opinions on Consent, Communication & Decision Making, supra note 112
(“Physicians who treat minors have an ethical duty to promote the developing autonomy of minor
patients by involving children in making decisions about their health care to a degree commensurate
with the child’s abilities.”); see also APA Report, supra note 3, at 74 (“It is now recognized that
adolescents are cognitively able to participate in some health care treatment decisions, and such
participation is helpful . . . .”).
121
Iltis, supra note 10, at 333, 334 (noting that “some psychological research suggests that
adolescents have the cognitive capacities to make decisions comparable to those adults make” and, after
documenting the expansion and basis for the mature minor doctrine, arguing that “regardless of its
application to clinical health care decisions, [the mature minor doctrine] ought to be set aside in the
research setting in favor of greater parental involvement”); see also Jennifer Rosato, What are the
Implications of Roper’s Dilemma for Adolescent Health Law?, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 167, 189 (2011)
(arguing that mature minors should be given greater autonomy in healthcare decision-making because
adolescents are capable of making these type of unhurried, logical decisions).
122
See, e.g., Soc’y. Adolescent Med., Access to Healthcare for Adolescents and Young Adults, 35 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 342, 343 (2004) (“Adolescents should be able to receive confidential services
based on their own consent whenever limitations to confidentiality would serve as an obstacle impeding
their access to care . . . Efforts to repeal minor consent laws or to place limits on the confidentiality of
services for adolescents who are minors could undermine their access to essential services and should be
opposed.”); Rosato, supra note 121, at 170, 171 (“[The mature minor doctrine] may affect adolescents’
ability to participate in decisions as important as whether they should be able to get the Human Papillomavirus
(“HPV”) vaccine; decline genetic testing for late-onset diseases; obtain treatment for mental health problems;
consent to participation in research trials; or elect treatment to change gender identity.”); Iltis, supra note 10, at
333, 334.
123
This Article focuses in particular on damage health provider bans may do to the mature minor
doctrine. For an article criticizing the damage bans may do to parental rights, see, e.g., Wardle, supra
note 9 (suggesting that anti-SOCE laws may only be successfully upheld by ignoring and brushing aside
the Supreme Court’s support of “thick” parental rights).
124
Outside the context of healthcare, it is more common and more widely accepted for state
legislatures to restrict the rights of minors, without regard to their parents’ preferences or a court’s
judgment. For example, states limit when minors can purchase tobacco or alcohol without regard to
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unjustified.125 No state has yet banned state licensed providers from
providing SOCE to adults.126 In virtually every other context, minors have
access to the medical services offered to adults by virtue of parental
consent, mature minor consent, or judicial bypass consent. Moreover, it is
not at all clear why a legislature would be more capable of determining
minors’ “best interests” regarding SOCE than parents, doctors, the minors
themselves, or courts, who can take into account a particular minor’s needs
and preferences in making a decision.127 Without more compelling
empirical evidence of serious harm, nothing justifies removing all avenues
of consent for SOCE from minors.
Health provider bans on conversion therapy for minors seem especially
incongruous when compared to the law on elective cosmetic surgery for
minors.128 Breast augmentation has no physical health benefits and has
well-documented health risks.129 Like SOCE, this procedure seems to be
driven in part by complex societal sexual and gender ideals. Yet, no state
bans the ability of parents or mature minors to consent to this care. In fact,
approximately five thousand minors receive breast augmentation each

parental consent.
125
Despite very real autonomy concerns, health provider bans could still be justified by sufficiently
compelling empirical evidence that SOCE by state-licensed healthcare providers causes serious harm to
all minors and is never in their “best interests.” Anecdotal evidence of harm gleaned from studies on
adults, while troubling, is insufficient to counter the potential perils of health provider bans.
126
Conversion Therapy Laws, supra note 29.
127
One possible benefit of legislative bans put forth by some proponents is that bans stop parental
coercion of minors to participate in SOCE. Forcing a minor to engage in unnecessary, likely ineffective,
and potentially harmful SOCE is unethical. However, the irony of stripping autonomy to avoid coercion
is profound. It makes no sense for one concerned that parents might unduly influence minors—contrary
to their autonomy—to seek a solution that unconditionally strips minors of their autonomy.
128
To be clear, this Article does not advocate elective cosmetic surgery for minors and would in fact
suggest that in most circumstances such procedures are unethical. See, e.g., Alicia Ouellette, Body
Modification and Adolescent Decision Making: Proceed with Caution, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y
129, 155–56 (2012) (advocating respect of the autonomy interests of mature minors in the context of
body modification under limited circumstances). However, there are unique circumstances when
“elective” cosmetic surgery may be important to mental health. (After all, it is only recently that gender
confirming surgery became accepted as “medically necessary” as opposed to elective cosmetic surgery.)
The real issue, of course, is who should have decision-making authority over such care for minors.
Given each minor’s unique health needs, this Article posits that decision-making should remain with
mature minors, parents, the courts and healthcare providers—all of who can make individualized
decisions. Legislatures offer only blanket bans that, even if correct in the overwhelming majority of
cases, may unintentionally undermine the health of certain vulnerable individuals.
129
See
Teens
and
Breast
Implants,
BREAST
IMPLANT
INFO.,
http://www.breastimplantinfo.org/newsroom-2/teens-and-breast-implants/ (last visited June 17, 2016)
(noting that “40% of augmentation patients have at least one serious complication within three years”
and “breast augmentation patients are four times more likely to commit suicide compared to other
women the same age”).
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year.130 Similarly, tens of thousands of minors have elective rhinoplasty—
nose reshaping—each year.131 Surely, changes to a minor’s face trigger the
same sort of concerns about identity and self-worth as SOCE. Moreover, a
parent’s influence over a minor’s view of the ideal face, the importance of
appearance, and similar factors seems as likely to influence the decision to
seek elective cosmetic surgery as to influence a minor to participate in
SOCE. The disparate treatment between elective cosmetic surgery and
SOCE evidences how SOCE bans rest outside the norm and undermine
current notions of autonomy in medical decision-making for minors.132
Moreover, undermining autonomy and, in particular, the mature minor
doctrine, could have significant, unintended consequences on other aspects
of minors’ health. In recent decades, there has been a steady trend toward
the view that minors should have greater authority over their own
healthcare decision-making.133 This deference is especially pronounced
with regard to sexual health, mental health, and substance abuse treatment,
often referred to as “special sphere” healthcare decisions.134 While the
scope and exceptions vary, all fifty states currently recognize some version
of the mature minor doctrine with regard to “special” healthcare
decisions.135 However, expansion of the mature minor doctrine for sexual

130
See Sumanas W. Jordan & Julia Corcoran, Considerations in Breast Augmentation in the
Adolescent Patient, 27 SEMINARS PLASTIC SURGERY 67, 67 (2013) (noting that in 2011, 4,830
adolescents under 18 years of age received breast augmentation); Plastic Surgery for Teenagers Briefing
Paper, AM. SOC’Y PLASTIC SURGERY, http://www.plasticsurgery.org/news/briefing-papers/plasticsurgery-for-teenagers.html (last visited June 17, 2016) (“More than 8,234 breast augmentations were
performed on 18-19 year olds in 2013.”).
131
Surgeons performed 30,672 rhinoplasty procedures on patients age 13–19 in 2013. Id. While
some small percentage of these rhinoplasty procedures may be attributable at least in part to opening
breathing passages, the majority is performed to remove a hump, reshape the tip, reduce the size, or
straighten the bridge. Id.
132
This disparity also raises troubling concerns about possible religious discrimination. Because
conservative Mormons, Jews, evangelical Christians, and other minority religious groups who have
historically faced de jure and de facto discrimination favor SOCE, its prohibition merits close scrutiny.
Bans have already faced and will almost certainly continue to face constitutional challenge on First
Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of religion grounds. See, e.g., Welch v. Brown, 834 F.3d
1041 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 197 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2017).
133
Iltis, supra note 10, at 333.
134
An Overview of Minors’ Consent Law, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/overview-minors-consent-law (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (“The legal ability of minors to
consent to a range of sensitive health care services—including sexual and reproductive health care,
mental health services and alcohol and drug abuse treatment—has expanded dramatically over the past
30 years.”).
135
Iltis, supra note 10. Admittedly, most other special sphere care has a far more compelling justification on
public health or best interests of the child grounds than SOCE. However, erosion of minor autonomy in the areas
of sexual and mental health could create a slippery slope that jeopardizes critical special sphere care like
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and mental health decision-making remains both incomplete and fragile.136
Many social conservatives seek to repeal existing laws and oppose any
further expansion.137 These repeal efforts are deeply troubling from a
public health perspective because most experts acknowledge that robust
recognition of the mature minor doctrine is essential to ensuring minors’
utilization of sexual and mental health care.138 Stripping mature minors of
autonomy regarding SOCE sets a dangerous precedent. It undermines the
mature minor doctrine in the critical “special” healthcare decision-making
areas of sexual and mental health at a vulnerable time. In doing so, SOCE
health provider bans imperil existing progress on the mature minor doctrine
and thereby risk harming minors’ overall sexual and mental health.139
Having established that licensed provider SOCE bans are too narrow to
effectively limit abuses or to send a strong expressive message, and having
raised concerns that bans may actually jeopardize health by driving
participants to less safe providers and by undermining autonomy, this
Article turns to other possible solutions.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE RELIEF: IMPROVE INFORMED CONSENT, INCREASE
ACCOUNTABILITY, ELIMINATE STATE FUNDING
In particular, this Article suggests that efforts to combat SOCE should
focus on improving informed consent, increasing accountability for
deceptive practices, and eliminating state funding. While this Article
contraception, treatment and testing for sexually transmitted diseases, substance abuse treatment or mental
healthcare.
136
While largely beyond the scope of this Article, I believe it is important that states expand the
mature minor doctrine in these “special” areas, with broader, more clearly defined autonomy, especially
regarding contraceptive use. While parents generally play an effective role in healthcare decisionmaking for (or ideally with) minors outside the “special” sphere, in the context of sexual health, parents
are often poor surrogate decision makers. With regard to sexual health, parental decision-making is
often obscured by moral concerns rather than influenced by sound science and best health interests.
137
See,
e.g.,
Republican
Platform
2016,
GOP
37,
https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (“We support the right of parents
to determine the proper medical treatment and therapy for their minor children. We support the right of
parents to consent to medical treatment for their minor children . . .”).
138
See Soc’y. Adolescent Med., supra note 122 (“Efforts to repeal minor consent laws or to place
limits on the confidentiality of services for adolescents who are minors could undermine their access to
essential services and should be opposed.”); and Hill, supra note 112; see also Iltis, supra note 10; and
Rosato, supra note 121, at 170–71.
139
Even if one assumes that health provider bans might protect at least some vulnerable teens, my
concern is that the manner in which SOCE bans undermine the mature minor doctrine will, on balance,
have a greater deleterious impact on teen’s mental and sexual health. Lack of confidential access to and
decision-making regarding contraception, diagnosis and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, and
substance abuse simply pose a greater health risk to more teens.
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recommends these strategies in lieu of health provider bans, these tools
could also be used to supplement bans. Informed consent, consumer
protection, and defunding together promise broader relief. They can be
used to deter most paid providers and to educate, empower, and offer relief
to adults as well as minors. These approaches can be used immediately in
most states, even those without SOCE bans. Further, emphasizing these
widely accepted rights increases the likelihood that efforts to combat abuses
associated with SOCE will also improve social norms regarding sexual
minorities more generally.
A. Improved Informed Consent is Essential, if Imperfect
Robust informed consent offers a targeted and appropriate way to
decrease demand for SOCE among all potential participants, without the
limitations and negative side effects of health provider bans.140 Informed
consent refers to the process whereby a patient and healthcare practitioner
communicate regarding a proposed treatment’s nature, risks, benefits and
alternatives.141
Informed consent offers a good starting place for
combatting SOCE abuses because it is an already existing legal obligation
that applies to all potential participants, not merely minors, and because
SOCE providers have reportedly frequently failed to obtain appropriate
informed consent. 142
With regard to SOCE, meaningful informed consent requires that a
potential participant understand and appreciate the following:143

140
See, e.g., Caitlin Sandley, Note, Repairing the Therapist? Banning Reparative Therapy for LGB
Minors, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 247, 274–75 (2014) (arguing that improved informed consent is superior to
SOCE bans, in particular supporting legal reform to expressly allow minors of a certain age the right to
refuse outpatient mental health treatment like SOCE).
141
JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPARD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 51–52 (3d ed. 2013); see also
Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of Materiality, 216 U. ILL. L.
REV. 821, 823 (2016).
142
Informed consent is widely recognized in every state. However, its scope varies. See Nadia N. Sawicki,
Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical Practice, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 85, 110–11
(2016).
143
Some may argue that more robust informed consent also constitutes interference with traditional
physician-deference because the state is attempting to control doctor-patient communication. Admittedly,
informed consent requirements can constitute a form of interference in the doctor-patient relationship, but at least
as proposed, the interference is both milder and more justified. It is milder because it does not prohibit the
provision of any service but instead merely requires disclosures relating thereto. It is more justified because,
without informed consent, potential participants cannot meaningfully exercise autonomy (a central principle of
ethical medical decision-making). While informed consent is always essential to autonomous medical decisionmaking, it is especially critical when the proposed care is medically unnecessary, likely ineffective, and possibly
harmful—as in the case of SOCE. These circumstances, coupled with SOCE’s history of reportedly deceptive
practices, justify more stringent consent requirements.
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(1) SOCE likely provides no benefit:
(a) Same-sex attraction is a normal variant of sexual
behavior;144 and
(b) No empirical studies support the effectiveness of SOCE at
creating lasting change to sexual orientation.145
(2) SOCE involves some risk of harm:
(a) Potential harm includes anecdotal reports and clinical
observation of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, self-hatred
and other negative social and emotional consequences.146
(3) There are less risky alternative treatment approaches:
(a) Alternatives include active coping therapy that can be
provided in an environment that respects religious beliefs and
encourages abstinence, if desirable.
This alternative is
supportive and remains neutral regarding sexual orientation
outcome.147
Improving informed consent can directly address many problems
reported with existing SOCE practices. It can counter misinformation
regarding “benefits” reportedly used to encourage SOCE, such as that
same-sex attraction is a mental disorder or that SOCE offers a “cure.”148 It
can ensure that potential participants (and their parents) have full and
complete knowledge regarding the risks of and alternatives to SOCE.
When potential participants better understand the availability of safer
alternatives consistent with their religious beliefs, they will be more likely

144
See, e.g., APA Report, supra note 3 (“[S]ame-sex sexual and romantic attractions, feelings, and
behaviors are normal and positive variations of human sexuality regardless of sexual orientation
identity . . . .”); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 15 (opposing treatment “based upon the assumption
that homosexuality per se is a mental disorder or based upon the a priori assumption that the patient
should change his/her sexual homosexual orientation”); Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry,
supra note 15 (“[T]here is no medically valid basis for attempting to prevent homosexuality, which is
not an illness.”); see also The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender
Identity, supra note 19 (quoting position statements of fourteen leading professional organizations).
145
APA Report, supra note 3, at 41–42
146
Id.
147
Id. at v.
148
See FTC Complaint, supra note 57, at 31–33; Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 14, at 2.
Of course, informed consent could not be used to reign in the non-medical providers.
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to select alternatives. Moreover, any who continue to demand SOCE will at
least do so without the damaging false hope currently peddled.149 Through
education and the opportunity to persuade potential participants that they
have options consistent with their values, robust informed consent
empowers potential participants while also effectively deterring
participation in SOCE. Focusing on informed consent enhances rather than
undermines autonomy and should cause as large or larger decrease in SOCE
than health provider bans.150
While improving informed consent appears promising, it also has
limitations and is not an adequate remedy standing alone for several
reasons. First, non-medical SOCE providers do not have informed consent
obligations. So, like health provider bans, informed consent fails to address
misinformation or lack of information arising from these providers.151
Second, some states limit informed consent requirements to surgery or other
invasive treatment.152 Even medical providers may not be required to make
SOCE disclosures in these states. Third, regardless of factual information
provided, the persuasive opportunity presented by an informed consent
discussion may be limited when SOCE providers handle the
communication.153 Fourth, even robust informed consent leaves lingering
concerns about capacity and voluntariness of consent for SOCE.154 As long

149
Conversion therapy’s false promises are especially concerning because they seem likely to cause
a broader breach of trust with the medical establishment, endangering other aspects of a participant’s
health.
150
After all, informed consent applies in more states and provides protection to adults as well as minors.
Further, through informed consent, potential participants are educated, engaged, and offered a palatable
alternative instead of a prohibition that likely just drives them to unregulated providers or a more permissive
state.
151
As discussed below, consumer protection laws might be used to require non-medical providers to disclose
similar information to potential participants (or to suffer liability if harm arises from the unfair or deceptive
failure to disclose same), as long as such providers are paid.
152
See Sawicki, supra note 142, at 110–11.
153
While First Amendment analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that compelled (or
restricted) professional speech raises potential free speech challenges. See, e.g., Claudia Haupt, Professional
Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016) (analyzing the First Amendment free speech implications of SOCE
bans).
154
Informed consent has at least two other potential limitations. First, there is seldom liability for
failure to provide adequate informed consent. Among other reasons, this is due to the difficulty of
establishing damages proximately caused by insufficient disclosure. While largely beyond the scope of
this Article, one partial solution to this problem would be to directly tie inadequate disclosures regarding
SOCE to consumer protection violation. See, e.g., 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 25 (2016)
(“[O]ffering conversion therapy services in a manner that represents homosexuality as a mental disease .
. . constitutes an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.”);
and 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 3 (Reg. Sess.) (“It shall be unlawful for any person who practices or administers
conversion therapy [to minors] to practice or administer such therapy while in the conduct of trade or commerce .
. . [to do so] shall be considered an unfair or deceptive trade practice . . . .”); see also Quimbly v. Fine, 724 P.2d
403 (Div. 1 1986) (alleging a claim for lack of informed consent covered by UDAP). But see PRIDGEN, infra
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as society, families, and certain religious organizations stigmatize and
discriminate against sexual minorities, an individual experiencing same-sex
attraction may be desperate for any possible solution, no matter how
unlikely or risky.155
Improving disclosures without addressing the
structural violence and internalized stigma currently impeding truly
voluntary consent is an imperfect solution.156 It is an important first step
though, and when coupled with increased accountability for deceptiveness
and the expressive message of defunding discussed below, improving
informed consent remains a superior strategy to health provider bans.
B. Increasing Accountability and Transparency: The Promise of Consumer
Protection Litigation Combating Abuses Associated with SOCE
Pursuing consumer protection litigation offers several comparative
advantages over health provider bans.157 First, a consumer protection
approach provides a broader solution, available to more SOCE participants
and addressing more SOCE providers. Second, successful consumer
protection litigation directly and unequivocally discredits the same-sex
attraction disorder diagnosis. Third, litigation offers an immediate solution
and empowers former participants to actively participate in vindicating their
rights.158 Fourth, the public nature of consumer protection litigation
note 168, § 4:36 (summarizing case law limiting consumer protection claims involving certain professional
activities). If inadequate or misleading SOCE disclosures constitute a deceptive business practice as a
matter of law, informed consent will be easier and, given potential attorneys’ fees and treble damages,
more economical to enforce.
Second, informed consent is also sometimes criticized because disclosures are seen as ineffective
at increasing autonomous decision-making. This commonly results from an overload of information or
from the information being presented in language above the patient’s comprehension level. While
challenging, the best way to combat these problems is to require that the information be provided clearly
and prominently, and then to hold providers accountable for the failure to do so.
155
To be clear, spiritual well-being is an integral part of health. Religious organizations (as well as
families and societal structures) can greatly improve health. So, while some religious institutions have
historically played an ignominious role with regard to SOCE, it is important to acknowledge that
religious organizations can and often are essential partners in realizing health.
156
Individuals may be influenced by societal stigma, but this cannot justify stripping their autonomy.
Even if competent, informed individuals sometimes fail to make the best decisions for themselves, they
are still generally better decision-makers than legislators who lack personal interest and have a long
history of discriminatory legislation. Individuals are capable of understanding the risks and choices
involved in SOCE, and the best way to ensure their rights are protected is to ensure that they retain
decision-making autonomy.
157
When this Article primarily discusses state unfair and deceptive acts and practices statutes, a truly
comprehensive solution would also pursue unfair or deceptive acts and practices through the Federal Trade
Commission and through other state deceptive-based regulatory enforcement mechanisms.
158
One benefit of a consumer protection approach is that it does not generally require the passage of new,
SOCE-specific legislation in order to establish liability for unfair or deceptive SOCE practices by paid providers.
Specific legislation could, however, make liability both more certain and less expensive. See, e.g. 405 ILL.
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provides a multiplier effect, increasing knowledge, reshaping social norms,
and otherwise deterring SOCE. Fifth, by highlighting general rather than
specific rights, consumer protection litigation emphasizes similarities
between sexual minorities and the general population, helping to decrease
stigma and discrimination. This section explains these benefits while
acknowledging certain limitations to this approach.
1. Consumer Protection Litigation Offers Broader Accountability for
Anyone Deceived by SOCE
Consumer protection litigation offers potential redress to a wider range
of participants than bans.159 Most legislative efforts to date apply only to
licensed health professionals providing SOCE to minors and fail to offer
any remedy to adults.160 Yet, the sense of having a “disorder” that SOCE
arguably reinforces, as well as the false hope of a “cure,” likely impact
adults similarly to minors.161 Likewise, health provider bans offer no
redress against non-licensed providers, who can cause as much (or more)
harm as licensed providers.162 As compared to most current legislative
bans, consumer protection litigation expands both the group of people who
have a legal remedy and the providers who can be called to account.163
Litigation promises to compensate more victims and punish more deceptive
providers, thereby more effectively deterring future SOCE abuses.164
COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 25 (West 2016); 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 3 (Reg. Sess.).
159
While refined and revised herein, some of my preliminary thoughts on the benefits of consumer
protection litigation were published in Alexander, supra note 8, at 2.
160
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015); 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.850 (2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–53 (2016).
161
See APA Report, at 3.
162
See, e.g., Levine, supra note 71 (describing “Christian” residential camp providing SOCE that
utilized isolation, shackles, and beating on minors); Madden, supra note 71; Epstein, supra note 71;
FTC Complaint, supra note 57, at 2. Compare 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 3 (Reg. Sess.) (Connecticut
incorporates consumer protection accountability and defunding into its health provider ban statute but only for
minors) with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013), D.C. CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015), 405
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016), N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1–54, 55 (West 2014), OR. REV. STAT.
§ 675.850 (2016), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–53 (2016).
163
Even if consumer protection litigation is generally effective at enhanced accountability for abuses
associated with SOCE, over time, providers may be able to avoid liability by making more complete and
more accurate disclosures. For example, a savvy provider could literally quote the conclusions of the
American Psychological Association in its literature and have participants initial that they understand
that the medical establishment does not endorse a conversion therapy approach. While imperfect, better
disclosures are a step forward. Accurate information might deter some participants, and those who are
not deterred would at least have a more realistic understanding of the likelihood of success, possible
risks, and alternatives available.
164
Consumer protection litigation allows individuals who were victimized by false claims of
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2. Consumer Protection Litigation Directly Discredits the “Same-Sex
Attraction Disorder” Diagnosis that Stigmatizes All Sexual Minorities
Successful consumer protection litigation attacks the so-called “samesex attraction disorder” (“SSAD”) diagnosis directly, establishing that such
diagnosis is deceptive and unsupported by credible medical professionals.165
There is enormous vindication in a judge or jury recognizing SSAD as a
fraudulent diagnosis.166 Such a finding reinforces the notion that same-sex
attraction is not an illness to be cured but rather a normal, if less prevalent,
way to experience sexuality. This expressive recognition increases respect
for the dignity of all sexual minorities. So, unlike existing legislative bans
on SOCE that express an opinion only regarding what is appropriate for
minors, while remaining neutral on appropriate treatment for adults,
consumer protection litigation unequivocally rejects any same-sex attraction
disorder diagnosis as unfounded.167 In this way, consumer protection
litigation provides a superior expressive remedy.
3. The Value of Active Participation and Immediate Relief
Consumer protection litigation also builds the capacity of rights-bearers
to claim their rights. It empowers former recipients of SOCE, who actively
participate in vindicating their rights, thereby transitioning from victims to
victors. Litigation is preferable to bans because it develops the capacity of

effective conversion therapy to seek recompense for any deceptive or misleading business practices that
cause them injury. This removes at least some of the economic incentive to pedal false hope based on
dubious science. Over time, removing the economic incentive and punishing deceptive providers should
decrease the number of providers who offer patients ineffective conversion therapy services.
165
Judgment, Ferguson v. JONAH, 136 A.3d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2015) (No.
HUDL54731).
166
JONAH focused on deceptive statements (1) that same sex attraction is disordered and (2) that the
JONAH program could change a participant’s sexual orientation. It may also be possible to use UDAP laws to
challenge other SOCE practices. For example, some SOCE providers undermine transparency and make it
difficult if not impossible to monitor the quality of care by requiring participants to agree in advance that they
will not disclose their SOCE experiences. See, e.g., Agreements and Liability Release, JOEL INT’L 2:25 ¶¶
2, 8, 11, https://rightsignature.com/forms/Joel-2-25-Partici-55e0b2/token/410568c383a (last visited July
25, 2016) (requiring participants to keep their own experiences with SOCE confidential and to agree to
liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees if they disclose their experiences). Some providers also impede
accountability by requiring SOCE participants to agree in advance that they control the outcome of SOCE and/or
to release the provider from liability. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7 (releasing Joel from liability and affirming that change is
determined by each individual). It is worth considering whether some of these practices, which hinder
effective oversight, could also be successfully challenged.
167
Compare id., with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865–865.2 (West 2013), and D.C. CODE § 71231.14a (2015), and 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 48 / 1–30 (2016), and N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1-54, 55
(West 2014), and OR. REV. STAT. § 675.850 (2016), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 8351–53 (2016).
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the rights-holders and empowers them personally as they take action to
address SOCE.
Individual legal action also provides immediate relief. Most, if not all,
states already have consumer protection laws.168 Accordingly, through
consumer protection litigation, most individuals harmed by SOCE can
pursue damages and other relief without waiting for further legislative
reforms.169
Consumer protection litigation offers a meaningful
accountability measure and enables many harmed consumers to actively
challenge SOCE practices today.
4. Public Trials Increase Transparency and Deter SOCE
Such litigation also tends to generate publicity, shining light on
degrading and inhumane SOCE practices and helping to mobilize public
opposition to SOCE.170 For example, the JONAH trial brought to light that
the SOCE providers were making some men undress and stand naked in a
circle, and making other men undress and touch their genitals in front of the
counselors.171 Exposing specific, seemingly absurd practices helps to
galvanize public opposition. In this way, impact litigation effectively
reshapes social norms and deters SOCE.
Increasing public awareness of the lack of credible scientific support for
SOCE, and of the harm SOCE has caused some participants, can have a
multiplier effect. It both educates potential participants about the pitfalls of
SOCE and engenders greater sympathy in the general public for those who
struggle with same-sex attraction. In fact, personal narratives, as developed
and told in litigation, have a greater impact on changing behavior and social
norms than information alone.172 As more people appreciate the harm
caused by deceptive SOCE practices and relate to the individuals injured

168
See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 1:1, 5
(2016–2017 ed.).
169
However, not all states’ consumer protection laws are broad enough to allow a claim for any
unspecified unfair and deceptive business practice. See Dubrowski, supra note 8, at 77–90 (a practiceoriented article analyzing state laws to demonstrate opportunities and obstacles in applying the JONAH
model); Satira, supra note 8, at 645 (discussing possible roadblocks to widespread consumer protection
attacks); PRIDGEN, supra note 168, Ch. 4.
170
Of course, this assumes that arbitration clauses are not used in SOCE provider contracts to circumvent
public trials.
171
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 14, at 13–14.
172
See cf. Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2414 (1989); Kimberlianne Podlas, Symposium, The Tales
Television Tells: Understanding the Nomos Through Television, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 31, 36
(2006).
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thereby, same-sex attraction will be de-stigmatized. Consumer protection
litigation can be used effectively, as it was in the JONAH case, to sway
public opinion, creating a multiplier effect, reshaping social norms, and
deterring SOCE.
5. Emphasizing General Rather than Specific Rights Builds Bridges
Similarly, by focusing on deception, consumer protection litigation
emphasizes rights of general application rather than “special” rights for
sexual minorities.173 No one should be deceived into paying for services by
false promises. In this way, consumer protection litigation highlights
common ground between those who experience same-sex attraction and
those who do not. In doing so, consumer protection litigation helps build a
bridge and emphasizes the universal application of rights. This general
rights approach plays an important role in reshaping social norms regarding
sexual minorities.
6. The Limitations of a Consumer Protection Litigation Strategy
While consumer protection litigation is a promising tool to empower
rights-holders, to combat deceptive SOCE practices, and to change social
norms, it also has limitations.
i. Remedy After Harm Accrues, But Primarily Indirect Prevention
First, consumer protection litigation arguably only offers a remedy after
harm occurs. It provides relief for any economic harm caused by unfair or
deceptive SOCE practices. However, it fails to prevent such harm from
occurring in the first place, at least directly. While over time successful
litigation should deter SOCE participants and providers, it does not
173
See cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 797–97 (2011)
(“[General] claims . . . emphasize what all Americans . . . have in common. The claim that we all have a
right to sexual intimacy, or that we all have a right to access the courts, will hold no matter how many
new groups appear in this country. As such, [general] claims may be one way in which we fashion a
new, more inclusive sense of ‘we.’”); Victor, supra note 8, at 1537–38 (criticizing bans for generating
political backlash as “special” rights for sexual minorities and praising the utilization of deceptive-based
regulation as “general” rights that help unite all people). The success of a general rights approach to
sexual orientation under international law also evidences its efficacy. By focusing on equality, privacy
and non-discrimination, sexual minorities have made enormous strides over the last twenty-five years in
United Nations-affiliated human rights monitoring and implementing bodies. This is not intended to
suggest, however, that specific rights are never appropriate to combat unique discrimination faced by a
marginalized group.
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immediately decrease access to SOCE (even for minors with regard to
licensed mental health providers). Despite this short-term limitation, given
consumer protection litigation’s substantially broader scope—all SOCE
participants who were deceived and any providers who were paid—it
should decrease SOCE as much or more than bans in the long run.
ii. Inefficiency and Cost Concerns
Second, some may argue that consumer protection litigation can be
inefficient and costly.174 It usually addresses harm caused to individual
plaintiffs by the particular providers sued. Each case can be expensive and
time consuming to try, and damages tend to be relatively low.175 Each case
also requires a plaintiff who is willing to testify that he or she attempted
conversion therapy and failed, with invasive, personal discovery of his or
her mental health and sexual preferences made public.
However, two years post-verdict in JONAH, these concerns appear less
substantial.176 Cost concerns can be mitigated by the fact that many states
allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys’ fees and state attorney
generals to prosecute actions.177 Further, a case-by-case strategy may not
be required. Some states will allow an agency to enjoin specific deceptive
practices from all providers who have received notice and an opportunity to
be heard178 and other state courts may be willing to certify a class action.179
Even without these aggregating mechanisms, a case-by-case approach may
174
See Diane Hoffmann & Jack Schwartz, Stopping Deceptive Health Claims: The Need for a Private Right
of Action Under Federal Law, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 53, 78–79 (2016) (noting problems and inefficiencies with
current state-based consumer protection causes of actions).
175
See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 174, at 79 (noting how some state consumer protection laws have
imposed ceilings as low as $1,000 on civil penalties). In SOCE cases, actual damages are typically only the
amounts paid for the conversion therapy, a relatively small amount even when trebled. Attorneys’ fees
are the real deterrent to providers, as such cases can accrue seven-figure attorneys’ fees, costs, and
expenses. For example, in JONAH, the court awarded $3.5 million for attorneys’ fees and costs, while
the plaintiffs themselves received only thousands of dollars in recovery. Order, supra note 52, at 2.
176
Shortly after the JONAH verdict, I was somewhat more skeptical regarding consumer protection
liability’s efficiency. See Alexander, supra note 8. However, after observing sweeping disclosure changes postJONAH, gaining a better understanding of SOCE networks, and discussing the issue with Jacob Victor, I have
become convinced that consumer protection litigation can be a cost effective means for widespread change.
177
See PRIDGEN, supra note 168, § 6:17 (attorneys’ fees) and § 7:1 (state agency enforcement).
178
When the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issues a final cease and desist order adjudicating an act
unfair or deceptive, it can enforce that order as a de facto industry-wide rule by seeking civil penalties from any
non-respondent who engages in similar conduct with actual knowledge that its act or practice is unfair or
deceptive. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B). Some states allow injunctions that accomplish a similar end state-wide. See
PRIDGEN, supra note 168, § 6:9 (injunctions).
179
See PRIDGEN, supra note 168, § 6:28 (class actions). Of course, this assumes that providers do not receive
class action waivers and that participants are able to establish commonality and other class certification
prerequisites.
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be unnecessary. SOCE providers tend to be a relatively close-knit network,
sharing practices and communicating, making it far more likely that
targeted litigation would effectively deter deceptive or unfair practices more
broadly. In fact, demonstrable improvement in disclosures practices
following the JONAH verdict evidences the power of consumer protection
liability.180 The JONAH and Alabama cases also indicate that courageous
individuals will be willing to come forward and testify if necessary to stop
abusive practices.181 So, cost and inefficiency should not prevent consumer
protection litigation from serving as an effective strategy in combatting
deceptive SOCE practices.
iii. Danger of Loss: States Where Recovery Could Be Difficult
While a state-by-state analysis of the challenges of consumer protection
litigation attacking SOCE abuses is beyond the scope of this Article,
another potential limitation is that prevailing could be difficult in some
states.182 This limits the breadth of the consumer protection remedy and
creates the need to consider the risk of bad precedent in tougher
jurisdictions.183 After all, while successful consumer protection litigation
180
For example, most national SOCE organizations changed their websites to downplay promises of success
after JONAH. People Can Change even changed its organization name to Brothers Road. See BROTHERS ON A
ROAD LESS TRAVELED, http://www.brothersroad.org (last visited Jun. 28, 2017). The Alliance for Therapeutic
Choice and Scientific Integrity stopped using the phrase sexual orientation change efforts and instead switched to
the arguably less misleading description, sexual attraction fluidity exploration in therapy (SAFE-T). See Rosik,
supra note 2. Of course, other changes—including legislative health provider bans—may also have contributed
to the positive changes that have occurred post-JONAH.
181
See Ferguson v. JONAH, 136 A.3d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 18, 2015) (No. HUDL547312);
Levine, supra note 71; Madden, supra note 71; Epstein, supra note 71.
182
Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 174, at 79 (noting how some state consumer protection laws require
litigants to demonstrate a provable falsehood rather than lack of substantiation); Dubrowski, supra note 8 (a
practice-oriented article analyzing state laws to demonstrate opportunities and obstacles in applying the
JONAH model); Satira, supra note 8, at 671–79 (discussing possible roadblocks to widespread consumer
protection attacks).
To identify four potential obstacles to consumer protection success: (1) some states require proof
of reliance for consumer protection claims, (2) some states do not allow recovery of attorneys’ fees
making such cases economically infeasible, (3) many states follow the more flexible Daubert standard
for determining the reliability (and admissibility) of expert testimony, rather than the Frye standard used
in the JONAH case, and (4) some states exempt professional activities, like providing healthcare
although typically not advertising, from consumer protection coverage. Dubrowski, supra note 8, at
n.30, 93, 96; see also PRIDGEN, supra note 168, Ch. 4. Under the Daubert standard, it is more likely
that a proponent of SOCE would be able to offer competing expert testimony, increasing the likelihood
that at least some juries might refuse to find SOCE deceptive.
183
Another potential litigation loss risk arises from First Amendment concerns. Because the provision of
SOCE is closely associated with both free speech and the free exercise of religion, regulating it may pose First
Amendment challenges. While a case lost on these grounds might not have the same detrimental effect as a case
in which SOCE practices were found not to be unfair or deceptive, it would still create a barrier to future
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effectively counters at least the expressive harm of a same-sex attraction
diagnosis, unsuccessful litigation could have the opposite effect. A defense
verdict could serve to legitimize the proposition that sexual minorities are
disordered and should be avoided. Even with the danger of loss, consumer
protection litigation remains a broader and more promising solution than
health provider bans.184 On balance, consumer protection litigation
provides the best solution to increase accountability, respect autonomy, and
deter harmful SOCE practices.185
C. Defunding Is Essential as Good Stewards of Taxpayer Dollars
The third component to addressing SOCE should be defunding.186
Regardless of one’s views on same-sex attraction, the empirical lack of
efficacy of SOCE mandates that limited state healthcare funds be spent on
other more effective health initiatives.187 The ineffectiveness of SOCE
justifies Medicaid Opinion Letters or other means to eliminate any state

accountability efforts. Nonetheless, consumer protection attacks seem less likely to run afoul of constitutionally
protected rights than health provider bans (since only deceptive practices are targeted), and First Amendment risk
is inherent in any effort to address SOCE abuses. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (deceptive or misleading speech may be regulated without
violation of the First Amendment).
184
Like health provider bans, consumer protection litigation offers no solution to unpaid SOCE providers.
185
While this Article primarily focuses on consumer protection litigation, I also agree with Jacob M.
Victor that utilizing deceptive-based regulation should be part of a comprehensive solution. Victor,
supra note 8 (arguing in favor of deceptive-based regulation but skeptical of JONAH-style consumer
litigation). The Article emphasizes consumer protection litigation because I believe it to be the more
promising solution. While regulatory enforcement could be effective, it is notoriously underfunded for
both investigation and prosecution. Moreover, discipline and censure are often private (or at least
unheralded), and as such, litigation seems more effective for changing social norms and deterring future
participants and providers.
186
New York provides an excellent model of refusing to use public funds to pay for SOCE. See,
e.g., N.Y. St. Dep’t. of Health, supra note 45; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.8(d)
(2016) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, no facility shall provide services to minor
patients that are intended to change such minor’s sexual orientation or gender identity . . . .”). States
should not follow New York’s model, however, regarding prohibiting private parties from including
SOCE funding in insurance contracts, as that unjustifiably interferes with freedom of contract. See N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 52.16(n)(2) (2016) (“No policy or certificate shall provide coverage
for conversion therapy rendered by a mental health professional to an individual under the age of 18
years.”).
Connecticut also provides a possible defunding model. See 2017 Conn. Acts 17-5, § 4 (Reg. Sess.)
(prohibiting public funds from being expended to practice, to provide a referral, or to provide benefits for
conversion therapy to minors). Connecticut limits defunding to minors; this Article proposed defunding SOCE
for adults as well as a matter of good stewardship.
187
Because defunding SOCE stems from the lack of scientific evidence of efficacy, as opposed to moral
judgments of right or wrong, it is not analogous to defunding Planned Parenthood.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3032530

2017]

Autonomy and Accountability

321

funds from being expended for these futile efforts. Good stewardship
requires refusing public reimbursement for SOCE.188
Defunding SOCE serves the additional goal of directly decreasing
access.189 Unlike informed consent and consumer protection that primarily
deter through education and accountability, defunding should immediately
stop at least some SOCE participants. In this regard, defunding is like
banning, only substantially broader in its application and somewhat more
limited in its restriction of autonomy.190
Prohibiting state reimbursement for SOCE also serves the same
expressive aims as bans, only more effectively. By refusing to fund SOCE,
states warn the public, distance themselves, and de-medicalize SOCE.
Implicitly, defunding conveys the message that SOCE are unnecessary and
ineffective and that same-sex attraction is not a medical disorder.
Defunding also distances states from any SOCE providers. More
progressive states may use Opinion Letters or other means, as New York
has, to explicitly state that SOCE will not be funded because
“homosexuality is not considered a medical condition that requires
treatment.”191 However, even if states refuse to explicitly recognize that
same-sex attraction is within normal variants of human sexuality,
eliminating state funding of SOCE would decrease access, free state
healthcare funds for more effective healthcare services, and serve an
expressive purpose.192

188
Without commenting on the relative merits (and potential costs) of such restriction, the ban on
federal funding for sterilization of an individual below the age of twenty-one is akin to my
recommendation that states refuse to fund SOCE. Both allow individual autonomy, while stewarding
resources based on legitimate, historically based concerns of abuse and healthcare priorities.
189
While decreasing access to care based on ability to pay might be problematic for effective, high
quality care, it does not pose the same concerns with regard to SOCE. Justice allows, and arguably
requires, that limited public funds be saved for more beneficial care.
190
Through bans, legislatures usurp individual autonomy. While defunding also decreases access, it
leaves some modicum of individual choice for those who can find a way to pay. Defunding represents
an appropriate exercise of legislative authority; states can and should determine appropriate use of state
funds. In contrast, bans signal state interference with autonomous, informed healthcare decision-making
that should generally be left to individuals and their care providers.
191
N.Y. St. Dep’t. of Health, supra note 45; see also Knauer, supra note 80; Stein, supra note 80.
192
See The Lies and Dangers of Efforts to Change Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity, supra note 19
(quoting positions of fifteen leading professional organizations); see also Position Statement on Gender Identity
and Same-sex Orientation, Attraction, and Behaviors, WORLD PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Mar. 2016),
http://www.wpanet.org/detail.php?section_id=7&content_id=1807; Being Gay is Just as Healthy as Being
Straight, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (May 28, 2003), http://www.apa.org/research/action/gay.aspx.
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V. CONCLUSION: CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION AND ENHANCED
INFORMED CONSENT, RATHER THAN LEGISLATIVE BANS, SHOULD BE
EMPHASIZED TO COMBAT ABUSES ASSOCIATED WITH SOCE
Many states have recently or will soon address the best health policy
response to SOCE. Several states (and even more cities) have responded to
SOCE concerns by prohibiting licensed health professionals from providing
SOCE to minors.193 Non-profits have focused on asserting consumer
protection claims against both licensed and unlicensed SOCE providers
who deceive potential participants regarding the appropriateness and
efficacy of SOCE.194 These approaches have similar goals and are not
inconsistent, but each has consequences for larger health policy and for
social norms regarding sexual minorities.
This Article argues that the potential benefit of health provider bans,
delay or deterrence of SOCE for some minors and expressive
condemnation, can also be realized through other means that pose less risk
to SOCE participants and to autonomy in healthcare decision-making. By
focusing on enhanced informed consent, increased consumer protection
accountability, and defunding SOCE, states avoid undermining the mature
minor doctrine and potentially sending SOCE participants to unmonitored,
untrained, less-accountable providers. Moreover, these tools provide a
much broader remedy. They offer a potential solution to adults as well as to
minors and promise to hold both healthcare and non-healthcare providers
accountable. Further, this approach presents an immediate avenue of relief
for minors in states that have not yet, or will not, pass SOCE health
provider bans. For these reasons, states and human rights activists should
emphasize robust informed consent, consumer protection accountability,
and defunding in the fight against SOCE abuses.

193
194

See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 675.850 (2016).
FTC Complaint, supra at 57, at 9–36.
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